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TAXATION, COMPENSATION, AND 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
Jonathan L. Entin† 
Erik M. Jensen‡ 
 
Judicial independence is a principle central to Article III of the 
Constitution. Life tenure furthers independence, of course,1 but the 
founders thought that life tenure by itself would not be sufficient. 
How independent—and therefore impartial—would a “tenured” judge 
be if Congress could adjust his compensation downward for not de-
ciding a high-profile case in the desired way or if Congress could give 
him a bonus for coming to the right result? 
It is not a perfect solution to the problem, but the Compensation 
Clause provides that federal judges governed by Article III “shall, at 
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall 
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”2 As the Su-
preme Court explained in 1980, making ample use of tautology: 
The Compensation Clause has its roots in the longstanding 
Anglo-American tradition of an independent Judiciary. A Ju-
diciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature 
is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges 
                                                                                                                  
† Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. 
‡ David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. The authors 
thank Justin Hughes for his able research assistance, participants in the symposium for their 
stimulating questions and discussion, and the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review 
for organizing the program. 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
2 Id. (emphasis added). The Compensation Clause is inapplicable to Article I judges, and 
whether a person was an Article I or an Article III judge was a critical issue in some older litiga-
tion regarding judicial compensation. See, e.g., O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 
(1933) (holding that justices of District of Columbia courts are Article III judges whose com-
pensation may not be diminished); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (holding that 
the Court of Claims, as then constituted, was an Article I court, so its judges were not protected 
by the Compensation Clause). 
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who are free from potential domination by other branches of 
government.3  
And, Justice Story wrote in 1833, the Compensation Clause was abso-
lutely critical to this enterprise: “Without [the Compensation Clause] 
the other [constitutional provision], as to the tenure of office, would 
have been utterly nugatory, and indeed a mere mockery.”4 
If the concern is that Congress (and, in some special circum-
stances, the executive5) might use compensation to affect judicial 
behavior, the Compensation Clause is incomplete. By its terms, it 
does not preclude Congress from rewarding favored judges with sal-
ary increases.6 The Clause nevertheless prevents Congress from 
                                                                                                                  
3 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980). 
4 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1622, at 490 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833). Story also worried about the ability of Congress, 
aided and abetted by the president, to circumvent the life-tenure rule by abolishing courts on 
which tenured judges sit, which happened early in the Jefferson administration. See id. §§ 1627-
28, at 494-97. Although the affected judges seemingly accepted Congress’s actions at that time, 
insofar as they did not litigate the issue, such a congressional step is almost inconceivable today. 
5 See infra notes 16, 20-21 and accompanying text. 
The argument has been made that the principles of judicial independence reflected in life 
tenure and the Compensation Clause were also intended to protect individual judges from their 
judicial colleagues. See, e.g., McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Dis-
ability Orders, 264 F.3d 52, 64-66 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting federal district judge’s challenge 
to power of Judicial Conference to sanction him). The Supreme Court had seemed to approve 
that proposition, see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 n.10 
(1982) (noting that constitutional guarantees “insulate[] the individual judge from improper 
influences not only by other branches but by colleagues as well”), but the D.C. Circuit in 
McBryde stated: 
That individual judges are direct beneficiaries of the tenure and salary protections of 
Article III by itself hardly shows that the overarching purpose of these provisions 
was to insulate individual judges against the world as a whole (including the judicial 
branch itself), rather than . . . to safeguard the branch’s independence from its two 
competitors. 
McBryde, 264 F.3d at 65; see also Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A 
History of Federal Judicial Service—and Disservice—1789–1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 334 
(1993) (“[T]he protection of judicial independence is intended to support impartial decision-
making for the benefit of litigants and society, not for the benefit of individual judges.”). In any 
event, given that judges have no control over each other’s salaries, it is hard to see how the 
Compensation Clause could affect an intra-judiciary conflict. 
The McBryde Compensation Clause saga continued in McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002), which rejected the judge’s contention that not reimbursing him for ex-
penses incurred in filing mandamus actions—he challenged removal of two cases from his 
docket—unconstitutionally diminished his compensation. In initiating the proceedings, 
McBryde was like any other plaintiff: “The government did not mandate that Judge McBryde 
incur these litigation costs, nor did it reap the benefit of the imposition of those costs . . . .” Id. at 
1369. 
6 Part I.A discusses why the founders decided not to have the Clause work both ways. 
Furthermore, the Clause has nothing to say about methods unrelated to diminished compensa-
tion that Congress might use to punish the judiciary (in law school hypotheticals, at least). The 
Compensation Clause does not preclude Congress from limiting appropriations for the judicial 
branch to show unhappiness with the judiciary. See Mark C. Miller, When Congress Attacks the 
Federal Courts, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075, 1083 (2006). For example, Congress might 
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showing unhappiness with the judiciary by reducing compensation—
of individual judges or of the judiciary as a whole. And, as a practical 
matter, it prevents Congress from affecting ongoing litigation by 
threatening to reduce compensation. (Legislators can make threats, of 
course, but no threat can be carried out.) 
The Compensation Clause says nothing specifically about taxation, 
but the Clause has always been understood to affect the taxing power 
as well—and with good reason.7 If taxation were exempt from the 
Clause’s dictates, the Clause would be easy to circumvent. Rather 
than directly reducing salaries, Congress could get the same substan-
tive result by levying a tax with a disproportionately negative impact 
on federal judges.8 
At a minimum, all of this means that Congress cannot direct a tax 
at the judiciary (or at specific judges). And a facially neutral statute 
motivated by a congressional desire to influence the judiciary (if that 
bad motive could be demonstrated) would probably fail constitutional 
requirements as well.9 
Those limitations mean something, but they do not seem to mean 
very much in today’s world. Even with all the overheated rhetoric 
now common in Washington, it is almost impossible to imagine Con-
gress’s mounting a straightforward economic attack on the judiciary. 
With or without a Compensation Clause, a tax clearly directed at the 
judiciary is just not going to happen—or so one hopes. 
                                                                                                                  
 
“curtail the judiciary’s physical facilities and fringe benefits as it pleases” or raise salaries of 
other federal employees while allowing judicial compensation to languish. Adrian Vermeule, 
The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 501, 531 (2002). 
7 But see Vermeule, supra note 6, at 504 (arguing that “the Compensation Clause should 
be read to prohibit only direct legislative decreases in the judges’ statutory salary, not subtle or 
indirect reductions in their overall income”). Professor Vermeule’s substantive understanding 
results from his legitimate concern about the role that judges play in interpreting the Clause: 
“[C]urrent doctrine ignores half of the Compensation Clause conundrum, precisely the half that 
the judges are most likely to ignore. The conundrum of the Clause is that enforcement of a rule 
protecting judicial independence is committed to judges who . . . have a financial interest in 
maximizing their compensation.” Id. at 522. Cabining the Clause’s scope lessens the risk of self-
interested interpretation. 
8 Cf. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 248-49 (1920) (“Does the provision merely forbid di-
rect diminution, such as expressly reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum per 
year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet effective, diminution, such as withholding 
or calling back a part as a tax on the whole?”), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 
557 (2001); id. at 254 (“Obviously, diminution may be effected in more ways than 
one . . . . Only by subordinating substance to mere form could it be held that [a judge’s] com-
pensation was not diminished [by the imposition of an income tax].”). 
9 The Supreme Court has not yet had to resolve that issue definitively, see United States 
v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 226 n.30 (1980), but the Court recently said the likelihood that a facially 
nondiscriminatory tax might hide an attack on the judiciary is “virtually nonexistent.” See 
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 571 (2001); infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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This article considers whether the Clause has any effect on the tax-
ing power beyond the decidedly unrealistic situations described 
above.10 The effect of the Compensation Clause has been litigated 
often since 1920, most recently in United States v. Hatter11—
probably the Supreme Court’s last word on the relationship between 
the Clause and taxation. In Hatter, decided in 2001, the Court consid-
ered, among other things, whether Congress could subject federal 
judges to Social Security taxes from which they had previously been 
exempt.12 When the dust had settled, the effect of the extension was 
generally to treat federal judges like other American taxpayers. But 
the Court went on to find that the extension of the tax funding the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) program to judges 
who were on the bench at the time of the extension discriminated 
against the judiciary and thus violated the Compensation Clause. 
The Court in Hatter came to some defensible conclusions. The 
Court stated unequivocally what everyone had thought was the case 
anyway: a tax of general application can apply to federal judges just 
as it does to everyone else. (Judges must pay federal income taxes on 
their judicial salaries, for example.) And older cases that had held to 
the contrary were explicitly repudiated. That result is clearly correct. 
But Hatter’s conclusion about the OASDI tax is not so clearly 
right. The concern motivating the Compensation Clause was judicial 
independence, not preserving the after-tax incomes of federal judges, 
and the extension of the OASDI tax had nothing to do with judicial 
independence. We will criticize the Court’s reasoning on these points 
at some length in Part III.E. 
The faults of that part of Hatter, such as they are, may not do any 
long-term damage, however. When the decision in Hatter appeared, 
the earth seemed to move,13 but the case is unlikely to have signifi-
                                                                                                                  
10 That the situations seem unrealistic today is not to question the legitimacy of the con-
cerns in 1787 and long thereafter over the possibility of such an attack. 
11 532 U.S. 557 (2001). 
12 We understand that some might cavil about use of the term “tax” to describe Social Se-
curity funding. Social Security was promoted as social insurance, with a sense that what a 
beneficiary ultimately received would be tied to what he had paid in to the system. Although 
that situation is different from the typical “tax”—where the connection, if any, between payment 
and benefit is far more tenuous—the term has been used so long to refer to Social Security 
exactions that we are loathe to discard it. In any event, we do not think that, under the Compen-
sation Clause, anything serious turns on whether Social Security levies that reduce a judge’s 
take-home income are taxes or something else. 
13 The conclusion about the OASDI tax surprised us, at least. See Jonathan L. Entin & 
Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial Independence: Hatter v. United States, 
90 TAX NOTES 1541 (2001); Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, United States v. Hatter and 
the Taxation of Federal Judges, 92 TAX NOTES 673 (2001). It is not unheard of for the Court to 
reject congressional exercises of the taxing power on constitutional grounds. See United States 
v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998) (invalidating the Harbor Maintenance Tax as applied to 
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cant practical consequences, except for the judges directly affected, 
because Hatter presented a set of facts that is unlikely to be dupli-
cated, or even approached, in the future. Indeed, it is all but impossi-
ble for a similar set of facts to occur again.14 
This Article begins with the original understanding of the Com-
pensation Clause and then moves, in Part II, to nineteenth-century 
developments, and, in Part III, to the developments in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, culminating with an extended discussion of 
Hatter. Part IV considers the post-Hatter effect of the Compensation 
Clause on taxation. Part V evaluates a second justification for the 
Compensation Clause, only tangentially tied to the founding debates 
but widely advanced in case law of the last ninety years, that the 
Clause, by improving the economic incentives for becoming and re-
maining a federal judge, is necessary to further the federal judiciary. 
Finally, Part VI contains a few thoughts on taxation, the Compensa-
tion Clause, and the turnover of federal judges.15 
I. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
The Compensation Clause is not mysterious. It is clear from the 
founding debates that the Clause was intended to help protect federal 
judges from external pressures that might keep the judges from acting 
impartially. (Although the executive could also apply economic pres-
sure to judges, Congress was the more likely culprit—and thus the 
real target of the Compensation Clause.16) The founders debated 
                                                                                                                  
 
exports under the Export Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5); United States v. Int’l Bus. 
Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996) (holding that the Export Clause does not allow for federal 
taxes on goods in export transit). But those cases are noteworthy precisely because they were 
unusual. See Erik M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2004); see also ERIK M. 
JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER 11, 136-46 (2005) [hereinafter JENSEN, TAXING POWER].  
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 This article focuses on the Compensation Clause, which applies only to federal judges 
governed by Article III of the Constitution. But similar issues can arise under compensation 
clauses contained in state constitutions. See, e.g., Maddox v. Hayes, 598 S.E.2d 505 (Ga. 2004) 
(holding that a constitutional provision prohibiting reduction in salary, allowance, or supplement 
of a sitting judge did not prevent reduction when the salary was determined to have been in-
flated erroneously); Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2004) (holding that the state 
constitution was violated by a statute that prohibited judges from receiving a 2003 cost-of-living 
increase and by the governor’s line-item veto that had the effect of removing funding for a 2004 
cost-of-living increase). Moreover, these issues can arise under the constitutions or general 
understandings of other countries. See, e.g., Provincial Court Judges’ Ass’n of New Brunswick 
v. New Brunswick, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 (Can.) (discussing the role of independent commis-
sions, intended to improve processes that ensure judicial independence, including those relating 
to compensation); Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Ed-
ward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (same). 
16 In general, the executive is not going to be able to take actions on its own to reduce judi-
cial compensation. The President might sign legislation that would have such an effect, but the 
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whether the Clause went far enough or whether it went too far, but 
there was no disagreement about its basic purpose. This suggests that, 
if a taxing statute imposes no pressure on the judiciary qua judiciary 
or on individual judges, its application should not be limited by the 
Compensation Clause.17 
The founders realized that guaranteed tenure would mean little if a 
judge’s compensation could be tied to the content of his decisions. 
Life tenure needed a back-up. As Alexander Hamilton explained in 
the first sentence of The Federalist No. 79, “Next to permanency in 
office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges 
than a fixed provision for their support.”18 
This was not a hypothetical concern for the founders. The Declara-
tion of Independence condemned King George because he had “made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, 
and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.”19 That history 
pointed to the importance of both life tenure and the Compensation 
Clause in protecting judges from the sovereign’s commands. 
In 1787, the King was out of the picture, but the fundamental issue 
had not changed. As Alexander Hamilton noted in 1802, “From the 
injunction, that the compensation of the Judges shall not be 
diminished, it is manifest, that the Constitution intends to guard the 
independence of those Officers against the Legislative Department: 
Because, to this department alone would have belonged the power of 
diminishing their compensations.”20 
Except for Hamilton’s focus on Congress as the only body likely 
to apply pressure on the judiciary21—others thought the executive 
could be dangerous as well—that passage repeats what everyone was 
saying about the purpose of the Compensation Clause at the Constitu-
tional Convention in 1787 and during the later ratification debates. 
Two questions were discussed in the founding debates: whether judi-
                                                                                                                  
 
impetus for such a reduction—if one can imagine its happening at all—would almost certainly 
come from Congress. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
17 The history of the Clause’s application in the real world is not, however, always consis-
tent with this proposition. See infra Part III. 
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
19 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). Some of the history of this 
issue, including English antecedents to the Compensation Clause, can be found in United States 
v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-21 (1980). 
20 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE EXAMINATION, No. 12 (1802), reprinted in 4 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 175, 175 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
21 Hamilton stressed the danger of legislative encroachments on judicial prerogatives: 
“[W]e can never hope to see realized in practice the complete separation of the judicial from the 
legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on 
the occasional grants of the latter.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 18, at 472. 
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cial compensation should be absolutely fixed for any sitting judge so 
as to protect his independence, and (an Anti-Federalist concern) 
whether the Clause helped give too much independence to federal 
judges.22 We will discuss those two questions to demonstrate that, 
despite some strong disagreements on other matters affecting the ju-
diciary, no one at the time of the founding had any doubt about the 
purpose of the Clause. 
A. The Debate About the Permissibility of Raises in Compensation 
Some founders thought the Compensation Clause did not go far 
enough to protect judicial impartiality. James Madison, for a very 
important example, wanted to make sure Congress could not change a 
judge’s compensation at all. Indeed, the resolution that was the basis 
for the first debate on judicial compensation at the Constitutional 
Convention, a resolution introduced by Edmund Randolph of Virginia 
and sponsored by the Virginia delegation, which included Madison, 
provided that the National Judiciary should “receive punctually at 
stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no in-
crease or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually 
in office at the time of such increase or diminution.”23 That is, all 
adjustments in compensation, upward as well as downward, would 
have been forbidden for any sitting judge.24 
When this provision of the Virginia plan was first debated at the 
Convention, on July 18, Gouverneur Morris (representing Pennsyl-
vania) moved that the words “or increase” should be struck because 
“the Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as circum-
stances might require, and . . . this would not create any improper 
                                                                                                                  
22 The founders did not discuss a related question: whether leaving courts to resolve Com-
pensation Clause questions might call judicial impartiality into question. See Vermeule, supra 
note 6, at 504 (arguing that Compensation Clause “doctrine should be restructured to take into 
account the complementary risk of judicial self-dealing that arises when judge-plaintiffs file 
suits to increase their compensation, suits that are heard by judge-adjudicators who have a direct 
or indirect financial interest in the proceedings”). 
23 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21-22 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1966) (May 29, 1787) (emphasis added) [hereinafter FARRAND]. Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina presented a similar proposal. See id., app. D, at 600 (“Judges . . . shall . . . re-
cieve [sic] a compensation which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance 
in office.”). 
24 The founders were not, however, oblivious to inflation. See infra notes 29-31 and ac-
companying text. How could they have been, after the runaway inflation of the Revolution? See 
Keith S. Rosenn, The Constitutional Guaranty Against Diminution of Judicial Compensation, 
24 UCLA L. REV. 308, 313 (1976). Under the original Virginia proposal, new judges could have 
been hired at salaries higher than those paid to already sitting judges. See infra note 33 and 
accompanying text. But then new judges would have been locked in to that compensation in 
perpetuity—unless they could figure out how to game the system. See infra note 36 and accom-
panying text. 
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dependence in the Judges.”25 Benjamin Franklin agreed that increases 
in compensation should be permitted: “Money may not only become 
plentier, but the business of the [judicial] department may increase as 
the Country becomes more populous.”26 Judges might actually have 
to work hard in the future, and, if so, they should be paid accord-
ingly—as long as independence was not compromised. 
Avoiding “improper dependence” was the universally acknowl-
edged goal. Madison understood that preventing a reduction in com-
pensation was more important than preventing an increase, but he was 
still bothered by the prospect of judges interested in higher compensa-
tion trying to curry favor with Congress: 
The dependence will be less if the increase alone should 
be permitted, but it will be improper even so far to permit a 
dependence. Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, 
or may be in agitation in the legislature, an undue 
complaisance in the former may be felt towards the latter. If 
at such a crisis there should be in Court suits to which leading 
members of the Legislature may be parties, the Judges will be 
in a situation which ought not to [be] suffered, if it can be 
prevented.27 
But there was an obvious practical problem with capping compen-
sation. Inflation could erode the economic position of sitting judges, 
and good judges might therefore leave for greener pastures. Life ten-
ure is not much protection if few can afford to serve for long.28 Rather 
than setting compensation at a specific dollar figure, Madison there-
fore suggested, why not tie fixed compensation to some always valu-
able commodity? He proposed that “variations in the value of money, 
may be guarded [against] by taking for a standard wheat or some 
other thing of permanent value.”29 (He added that a dramatic increase 
                                                                                                                  
25 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 44 (July 18, 1787) (emphasis added). If Madison reported 
the language of the resolution correctly, the motion should have been to delete “increase or,” 
but nothing in our argument turns on the placement of the “or.” 
26 Id. at 44-45. 
27 Id. at 45. 
28 The President’s situation is different. While his compensation “shall neither be in-
creased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected,” U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 7, the presidency was not expected to be a lifetime position and, in fact, had a 
fixed term. See id. cl. 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 18, at 473 (“As the President is to 
be elected for no more than four years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, fixed at the 
commencement of that period, will not continue to be such to the end of it.”); see also Ver-
meule, supra note 6, at 512-13 (accepting the historical explanation for differences between the 
President “who may neither be threatened nor bribed” and judges “who may be bribed but not 
threatened”). 
29 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 45 (July 18, 1787). 
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in the judicial caseload in the future—another justification given for 
not capping judicial compensation—did not require increasing judi-
cial salaries: “The increase of business will be provided for by an 
increase of the number who are to do it.”30) 
Linking judicial compensation to the value of wheat is an interest-
ing idea—think of all those judicial computers with the Chicago 
Board of Trade’s Web site bookmarked!—but Gouverneur Morris 
pointed out the difficulty: 
The value of money may not only alter but the State of 
Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of wheat, 
the same value would not be the same compensation. The 
Amount of salaries must always be regulated by the manners 
& the style of living in a Country.31 
Economic understanding may have been rudimentary in eighteenth-
century America, but some founders had the good sense to see that 
nothing, not even wheat, has “permanent value.” Morris prevailed on 
this point, and the prohibition against any “increase” was struck from 
the draft Clause by a substantial vote.32 
Madison did not give up. In late August, he and James McHenry 
of Maryland tried to reinstate the prohibition against increases in ju-
dicial compensation, and, after Morris repeated how unlikely it was 
that any particular asset would maintain a constant value as condi-
tions changed, George Mason spoke in favor of the Madison-
McHenry motion. Maybe new judges would have to be paid more for 
the country to maintain a quality judiciary, but that did not mean sit-
ting judges were entitled to more. He explained that “this might be 
provided for by an increase of salaries so made as not to affect per-
sons in office, and this was the only argument on which much stress 
seemed to have been laid.”33 
Madison and supporters lost again.34 General Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney of South Carolina responded to Mason, questioning the 
                                                                                                                  
30 Id. Madison might have been correct in one sense though not in another: having more 
district or appellate judges might help deal with large caseloads, but having more Supreme 
Court justices would not necessarily make that Court function more efficiently. 
31 Id. 
32 The vote was six in favor of striking (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, and South Carolina); two against (Virginia and North Carolina); and one absent 
(Georgia). Id. 
33 Id. at 429 (Aug. 27, 1787). 
34 Madison ultimately conceded that there was some merit to the argument that it ought to 
be possible to increase salaries should caseloads increase. At the Virginia ratifying convention, 
he said: 
I wished myself, to insert a restraint on the augmentation as well as diminution of 
their compensation . . . . But I was over-ruled. I must state the reasons which were 
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desirability of a multi-tiered compensation system, particularly if the 
more senior judges were likely to be paid less: 
The importance of the Judiciary will require men of the first 
talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary, larger than 
the U.S. can allow in the first instance. He was not satisfied 
with the expedient mentioned by Col: Mason. He did not 
think it would have a good effect or a good appearance, for 
new Judges to come in with higher salaries than the old 
ones.35 
Gouverneur Morris added that a prohibition on increases for sitting 
judges would be easy to circumvent: “[T]he expedient might be 
evaded & therefore amounted to nothing. Judges might resign, & then 
be re-appointed to increased salaries.”36 The Madison-McHenry mo-
tion was defeated, as was another motion made by Madison and 
Randolph that would have added the following words to the Compen-
sation Clause: “nor increased by any Act of the Legislature which 
shall operate before the expiration of three years after the passing 
thereof.”37 
Throughout the debates at the Convention no one questioned that 
the goal of the Compensation Clause was to protect judicial impartial-
ity. The founders knew that the Clause was imperfect, but it was a lot 
better than nothing. The most extensive discussion of the Clause in its 
final form is found in Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 79, which ex-
plained why a fixed salary would not work if the country was going to 
keep good people in office: 
It will readily be understood that the fluctuations in the value 
of money and in the state of society rendered a fixed rate of 
compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What might 
                                                                                                                  
 
urged.—They had great weight.—The business must increase. If there was no power 
to increase their pay, according to the increase of business, during the life of the 
judges, it might happen, that there would be such an accumulation of business, as 
would reduce the pay to a most trivial consideration. 
3 id. at 332 (June 20, 1788). 
35 1 id. at 429-30. And except in periods of deflation, the salaries for newer judges would 
always have been higher (obviously) than those for the older ones. 
36 Id. at 430. As the judicial nomination process has developed in our time, however, get-
ting through a second (or third) confirmation would not necessarily be easy at all—even if a 
presidential reappointment were forthcoming in such a case. 
37 Id. 
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be extravagant today might in half a century become penuri-
ous and inadequate.38 
But it was still necessary to restrict the power of the legislature “to 
change the condition of the individual for the worse. A man may then 
be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never be de-
terred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less 
eligible situation.”39 Congress should not be able even to contemplate 
a reduction in the compensation of individual judges. The threat of 
such a reduction might deter a judge from his duty, and “a power over 
a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”40 
B. The Anti-Federalist Fear of Excessive Judicial Independence 
The Anti-Federalists raised a different question about the 
Compensation Clause and the other provisions protecting judicial 
impartiality. Unlike James Madison, they worried that the 
Constitution provided too much independence for the judiciary. For 
example, Anti-Federalist “Brutus” complained in 1788 that “they 
have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the word. 
There is no power above them, to controul any of their decisions. 
There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be 
controuled by the laws of the legislature.”41 
Another Anti-Federalist, known as the “Federal Farmer,” while 
more restrained than Brutus, also concluded that the Convention had 
gone overboard. The Clause prevented the legislature from taking the 
sensible step of reducing judicial salaries across the board should 
economic conditions warrant: 
The same judge may frequently be in office thirty or forty 
years; there may often be times, as in cases of war, or very 
high prices, when his salary may reasonably be increased one 
half or more; in a few years money may become scarce again, 
and prices fall, and his salary, with equal reason and propriety 
be decreased and lowered: not to suffer this to be done by 
                                                                                                                  
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 18, at 473. 
39 Id. Hamilton’s focus in The Federalist on diminution in compensation was not new. In 
the so-called “Hamilton Plan,” basically his notes for a speech at the Constitutional Convention 
on June 18, 1787, Hamilton had said that judges should “have competent salaries to be paid at 
stated times and not to be diminished during their continuance in office,” with no mention of a 
prohibition against increases. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 23, app. F, at 626. 
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 18, at 472; see also id. at 473 (“The salaries of ju-
dicial offices may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to 
lessen the allowance with which any particular judge comes into office, in respect of him.”). 
41 ESSAY OF BRUTUS No. 15 (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 437, 438 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter STORING]. 
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consent of all the branches of the legislature, is, I believe, 
quite a novelty in the affairs of government.42 
In short, in a deflationary economy—more possible in the late eight-
eenth century than seems to be the case today—why should an across-
the-board reduction in judicial compensation not be possible? 
These Anti-Federalist concerns were not reflected in the final 
version of the Compensation Clause, but even the most ardent Anti-
Federalists supported the proposition that the judiciary should be 
protected to some extent. Brutus approvingly referred to the British 
practice of having “fixed salaries” for judges, for example.43 The real 
danger—the danger that a well-crafted Compensation Clause should 
protect against—was legislative and executive action directed 
specifically at the judiciary. 
C. The Original Understanding in the Supreme Court 
The original understanding that the Compensation Clause pre-
vented the reduction of judicial salaries in order to protect judicial 
independence was so clear that it took nearly two centuries for a case 
that squarely presented the issue to reach the Supreme Court. That 
case, United States v. Will,44 has attracted more attention for its dis-
cussion of the propriety of the Supreme Court’s addressing the merits 
of a lawsuit about judicial salaries than for its discussion of the Com-
pensation Clause.45 
For four consecutive years beginning in 1976, Congress sought to 
eliminate cost-of-living pay increases for federal judges. The Court 
invalidated the congressional action for the two years in which the 
increases had already gone into effect, including one when the meas-
ure repealing the increase was signed into law on the first day of the 
fiscal year.46 The other two measures were upheld because the cost-
                                                                                                                  
42 LETTER NO. 15 FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN (Jan. 18, 1788), re-
printed in 2 STORING, supra note 41, at 315, 318-19. 
43 ESSAY OF BRUTUS No. 15, supra note 41, at 438. 
44 449 U.S. 200 (1980). 
45 See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., Symposium, Judging Judicial Review: Marbury in the 
Modern Era—Foreword: A Silk Purse?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2557, 2560-61 (2003) (“A judge 
who has a financial interest in a case is no longer a judge . . . . United States v. Will in 1980 was 
decided ignoring this principle, and there are other examples.” (citing, inter alia, United States 
v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001)). Professor Vermeule has made a related point. Although courts 
may have to deal with Compensation Clause issues, because no other disinterested tribunal 
exists, he argues that doctrine under the Clause should reflect the courts’ peculiar position: 
“Constitutional compensation rules should dampen conflicts of interest and self-dealing by 
ensuring, as far as possible, that official decisions are not distorted by the officeholder’s finan-
cial interests . . . .” Vermeule, supra note 6, at 505. 
46 Will, 449 U.S. at 225-26, 230. 
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of-living increases had not yet taken effect when the legislation re-
scinding the pay raises was adopted.47 In reaching these conclusions, 
the Court emphasized the framers’ concern with protecting judicial 
independence.48 
Will resolved almost all issues relating to judicial salaries under 
the Compensation Clause.49 On the other hand, Will was not a tax 
case and did not directly address the taxation of judicial salaries. We 
next inquire into the original understanding about that subject. 
D. The Founding, Taxation of Income, and Taxes of                      
General Application 
The founding debates contain nothing about the relationship be-
tween income taxes and the Compensation Clause because there was 
no original understanding that anyone’s income or wages might be 
taxed.50 Accordingly, we cannot say for sure what the founders would 
have thought about taxing the income or wages of federal judges. 
But we have a pretty good idea. It is hard to see how a tax that 
reached everyone’s income, including that of judges, would have 
raised any serious concern about judicial independence. Nothing in 
the founding debates suggests that federal judges were to be exempt 
from the taxes that the founders did expect to be imposed, such as 
                                                                                                                  
47 Id. at 228-29.  
48 See id. at 217-20. The opinion also suggested that the Clause furthers the goal of en-
couraging qualified candidates to serve on the bench. See id. at 220-21. For criticism of this 
judicial-recruitment rationale, see infra Part V. 
49 For discussion of one potentially significant issue that Will might not have resolved, see 
infra note 115. 
50 The Articles of Confederation had effectively given the central government no revenue 
power, other than requisitioning funds from the states. See JENSEN, TAXING POWER, supra note 
13, at 17-22; Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and 
the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 
355 (1998). For this reason, merely permitting the government to levy duties on imports was 
such a major increase in the national taxing power that a tax on income was almost 
unimaginable.  
In any event, if an income tax had been imagined, it would have been understood to be 
subject to the direct-tax apportionment rule, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. § 9, cl. 4—or so 
one of us believes. In Jensen’s view, the Supreme Court was right in 1895 when it struck down 
an income tax on the ground that it was a direct tax that had not been properly apportioned 
among the states on the basis of population. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 
429 (1895), on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); see JENSEN, TAXING POWER, supra note 13, at 45-
49; Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitu-
tional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2366-75 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Apportionment]. Under 
this understanding, it was only the Sixteenth Amendment, which exempted “taxes on incomes” 
from apportionment, that made an unapportioned income tax possible. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVI. But see generally CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE 
MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005) (arguing, among other things, that the 
founders intended a basically unlimited taxing power, that the direct-tax clauses were not in-
tended to have significant effect, that Pollock was wrongly decided, and that the Sixteenth 
Amendment was unnecessary). 
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duties on imports.51 And the national direct taxes on real estate that 
were enacted from 1798 until 1861—and apportioned to meet the 
requirements of the direct-tax clauses of the Constitution52—
contained no exemptions for federal judges, even though such taxes 
would obviously have “diminished” the economic position of any 
judge subject to them.53 As the Supreme Court wrote in 1920, “If [a 
federal judge] has a home or other property, it may be taxed just as if 
it belonged to another.”54 
To be sure, the founders might have understood a generally 
applicable real-estate tax or duty on imports to be fundamentally 
different from an income tax. The real-estate tax or duty should not be 
limited by the Compensation Clause, one might argue, because it does 
not directly relate to “compensation,” as that term is generally 
understood—salary, fringe benefits, that sort of thing—while the base 
of an income tax will be measured, at least in part, by compensation.55 
But surely the founders would have thought that the Constitution 
would forbid a tax directed at the judiciary in a discriminatory way, 
even if in form not imposed on compensation.56 Under these 
circumstances, maybe some general principles of due process or equal 
                                                                                                                  
51 The founders thought the burden of such indirect taxes would be borne by purchasers. 
See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 50, at 2393-97. As far as we know, no one thought a 
judge purchasing imported goods should be immune from a generally applicable impost. 
52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. § 9, cl. 4; see also Jensen, Apportionment, supra 
note 50, at 2355-56 (discussing direct taxes on real estate enacted between 1798 and 1861). The 
statutes were as follows: Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292 (amended and made obsolete 
1864); Act of Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 24, 3 Stat. 255 (obsolete); Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, 3 Stat. 
216 (repealed 1816); Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, 3 Stat. 164 (repealed 1816); Act of Aug. 2, 
1813, ch. 37, 3 Stat. 53 (obsolete); Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597 (obsolete). 
53 See, e.g., Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597 (obsolete).  
54 Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 263 (1920), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 
U.S. 557 (2001). 
55 For that matter, one might argue that even an income tax does not affect “compensa-
tion,” as that term is used in many contexts. An income tax affects after-tax income; it does not 
affect the level of salary paid by employer to employee, at least not directly. See 31 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 475, 488 (1919); infra text accompanying note 78; cf. McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 
1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[L]itigation expenses—like most expenses of life—do not reduce 
compensation . . . . [E]xpenses simply claim a portion of the judge’s compensation after it has 
been paid.”). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore wrote that a judicial salary 
could not be taxed: “Apart from his salary, a federal judge is as much within the taxing power as 
other men are.” 253 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added). (As is discussed in Part III.E, Evans’s con-
clusion about income taxation of judicial salaries is no longer the law.) And taxes have been 
treated as potentially more dangerous to judicial independence than other “expenses” because 
they are mandated by the government. See McBryde, 299 F.3d at 1369 (noting that the taxing 
power “provides a unique opportunity for the government to target the judiciary”). 
56 If a real-estate tax remains a direct tax, such a tax would have to satisfy the apportion-
ment requirement for direct taxes, so that a state with, say, one-twentieth of the national popula-
tion would have to bear one-twentieth of the aggregate tax liability. See supra note 50; JENSEN, 
TAXING POWER, supra note 13, at 90-91. That would complicate the implementation of a real-
estate tax directed only at federal judges (just as it complicates any direct tax), but it would not 
by itself make the tax impossible. 
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protection—or a broader conception of judicial independence implicit 
in Article III—would apply, rather than the Compensation Clause. 
Whatever the source of the prohibition, however, the result should be 
the same: Congress cannot impose a discriminatory tax on federal 
judges. To do so would be inconsistent with the core idea of judicial 
independence.57 
In contrast, the reason that judges should not be constitutionally 
exempt from nondiscriminatory real-estate taxes, duties on imports, 
and taxes on incomes is that taxes of general application do not affect 
judicial independence. With a nondiscriminatory tax, neither the 
Compensation Clause nor any other constitutional prohibition should 
come into play.58 
II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY DETOURS 
Some nineteenth-century developments do not reflect an under-
standing that the Compensation Clause was directed at judicial inde-
pendence. They instead show confusion about the purposes of the 
Clause, and they also evidence self-serving judicial behavior—similar 
to that which would occur in later centuries as well. 
There was nineteenth-century sentiment that the Clause limited 
Congress’s power to tax the income of federal judges, but the 
question was not specifically ruled on by any court. When Congress 
enacted the Civil War income tax, which applied to persons with 
income over certain threshold levels (and specifically applied to 
federal officials59), Chief Justice Roger Taney protested to Secretary 
of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase about applying the tax to judges: 
                                                                                                                  
57 We recognize that a similar position has been characterized as “lame.” As Professor 
Vermeule noted: 
Many constitutional lawyers will have the instinct that even if a discriminatory tax 
on federal judicial salaries does not violate the Compensation Clause it must violate 
something—even if only “fundamental principles of Articles III” (as the government 
lamely posited during the oral argument of Hatter). But the instinct is wrong. Article 
III, and the Constitution generally, protect judicial salaries within the domain, but 
only within the domain, that the Compensation Clause covers. 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 530 n.119 (citation omitted). 
58 We are ignoring, for these purposes, specialized prohibitions like the Export Clause. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. We could probably come up with a hypothetical about a federal 
judge involved in exporting, but we both try to connect our hypotheticals with the real world 
(most of the time anyway). In any event, if a proposed tax were to fall on “Articles exported,” it 
would be forbidden, whether or not it discriminated against the judiciary. See JENSEN, TAXING 
POWER, supra note 13, at 137-38 (pointing out that the Export Clause imposes an “absolute 
prohibition” on taxing exports). 
59 A tax, initially set at 3 percent, was applied to “all salaries of officers, or payments to 
persons in the . . . service of the United States.” Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 86, 12 Stat. 432, 
472. 
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The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the 
compensation of every judge three per cent, and if it can be 
diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may in the 
same way be reduced from time to time at the pleasure of the 
legislature.60  
Taney would have been irritated anyway, but his irritation was 
presumably exacerbated by Civil War inflation that ate into judicial 
salaries.61 
Taney conceded the impropriety of litigating his objections to the 
tax—what federal judge could impartially hear the case?62—and he 
received no answer from Secretary Chase.63 But his position received 
a sympathetic response soon afterward. In 1869, Attorney General 
Ebenezer R. Hoar issued an opinion stating that a tax on judicial sala-
ries would violate the Compensation Clause (as would a tax on the 
president, protected by his own clause in Article II64), and that the 
income tax statute should therefore be interpreted so as to exclude 
persons whose income could not constitutionally be taxed.65 In 1872, 
as the Civil War tax was about to expire, Secretary of the Treasury 
George S. Boutwell ordered that the tax no longer be imposed on ju-
                                                                                                                  
60 Letter from R.B. Taney to Hon. S.P. Chase (Feb. 16, 1863), reprinted in 157 U.S. 701, 
701 (1895), and in SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY, LL.D. 432-34 (2d ed. 
1876) [hereinafter Taney Letter]. The letter is also quoted and discussed in Evans v. Gore, 253 
U.S. 245, 258-59 (1920), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001). At Taney’s 
request, this letter was made part of the Court’s records by an order dated March 10, 1863. See 
157 U.S. 701; see also TYLER, supra, at 435 (“The letter was, by this order, preserved, to testify 
to future ages that, in war no less than in peace, Chief-Justice Taney strove to protect the Consti-
tution from violation.”). Although it was included in Tyler’s Memoir, the letter was not offi-
cially published until 1895—in the same volume of U.S. Reports that contains the first decision 
in the Income Tax Cases, Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, on reh’g, 158 
U.S. 601 (1895). We do not know whether this was coincidental. 
61 See Rosenn, supra note 24, at 320; infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. 
62 See Taney Letter, supra note 60, 157 U.S. at 702, and TYLER, supra note 60, at 433 
(observing that “all the Judges of the Courts of the United States have an interest in the ques-
tion, and could not therefore with propriety undertake to hear and decide it”). Twentieth-century 
judges have been less reluctant to entertain Compensation Clause claims by their brethren, even 
in situations in which they have a financial stake in the outcome. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 
449 U.S. 200, 211-17 (1980) (invoking the Rule of Necessity). But see Vermeule, supra note 6, 
at 513-14 (noting “troubling institutional blindness to the risk of self-dealing” in cases like 
Will). 
63 TYLER, supra note 60, at 434. The Lincoln administration “preferred to avoid direct 
confrontation with the Chief Justice.” DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 575 
(1978). 
64 See supra note 28. 
65 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 161 (1869). A 1919 opinion by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer 
found the objections to such taxes unpersuasive after a more thorough review than Hoar had 
undertaken. See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 475 (1919); infra note 78 and accompanying text. The Su-
preme Court nonetheless reaffirmed Attorney General Hoar’s opinion the following year. See 
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 258-59 (1920), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 
(2001); infra Part III.A. 
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dicial salaries.66 And in 1873, the government refunded the taxes pre-
viously paid by federal judges and presidents.67 
Judges and presidents were presumably happy with that result. In 
lectures published two decades later, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, 
who joined the Court in 1862 and who had thus been subject to the 
tax, noted that the affected parties “naturally thought [this] was a very 
fair judicial construction of the constitutional provisions relating to 
that subject.”68 Miller’s longtime colleague Justice Stephen Field also 
subsequently questioned the validity of taxing judicial salaries in his 
opinion in the first of the two 1895 Income Tax Cases.69 
Despite Taney’s self-serving claim that the indirect effects of an 
income tax on judicial salaries might create “the suspicion of [undue] 
influence”70—a claim underlying the other objections as well—we do 
not see how those suspicions could have developed or why the judges 
deserved a refund. The Civil War income tax did not fall only, or 
primarily, on judges. It applied to everyone with income above a cer-
tain level, including federal officials generally. Where was the tax’s 
possible influence on the judiciary? No one who condemned the tax 
provided a convincing answer to that question. Indeed, no one really 
tried to be convincing. Each assumed that the impropriety of a tax on 
judicial compensation was self-evident. 
III. TWENTIETH-CENTURY JURISPRUDENCE AND BEYOND 
In this part we examine the high (and low) points of twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century jurisprudence on the Compensation Clause, be-
ginning with Evans v. Gore71 in 1920 and Miles v. Graham72 in 1925, 
and culminating in the 2001 decision in United States v. Hatter.73 
                                                                                                                  
66 TYLER, supra note 60, at 435. 
67 SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
248 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1980) (1891). 
68 Id. (footnote omitted).  
69 Justice Miller had died by that time, but Field concurred in the invalidation of the 1894 
income tax, pointing to the application of the tax to federal judges as one of many reasons the 
tax had to fall. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 604-06 (Field, J., concur-
ring), on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Miller, who served on the Court until 1890, also thought 
the Civil War income tax was unconstitutional as it applied to federal judges and the chief 
executive. See MILLER, supra note 67, at 247-48 (“It is very clear that when Congress, during 
the late war, levied an income tax, and placed it as well upon the salaries of the President and 
the judges of the courts as those of other people, that [sic] it was a diminution of them to just 
that extent.”). 
70 Taney Letter, supra note 60, 157 U.S. at 702; TYLER, supra note 60, at 433. It was self-
serving in that it supported exemption from taxation. It was hardly self-serving in the image it 
presented of the judiciary.  
71 253 U.S. 245 (1920). 
72 268 U.S. 501 (1925). 
73 532 U.S. 557 (2001). 
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Across that eighty-one-year period, the Court moved from seeing the 
Compensation Clause as an absolute prohibition against taxing judi-
cial compensation—the Court in Evans effectively blessed Taney’s 
complaint about taxing judicial salaries—to interpreting the Clause as 
restricting only those taxes that might affect judicial independence. 
A. Evans v. Gore 
In the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax statute, in 1913, 
the compensation of federal judges was exempted.74 Only eighteen 
years earlier the Supreme Court had invalidated an unapportioned 
income tax,75 and the boundaries of the Amendment, which elimi-
nated the apportionment requirement for “taxes on incomes,” were 
unclear. Feeling its way and wishing to avoid constitutional chal-
lenge, Congress drafted the Income Tax Law of 1913 conservatively, 
excluding many items from the tax base that might have been within 
its power to include.76 
Wartime revenue needs overcame congressional conservatism, 
however, and, in the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress extended the tax 
base, “including in the case of the President of the United States [and] 
the judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United 
States . . . the compensation received as such.”77 Disagreeing with 
what his predecessor Ebenezer Hoar had concluded fifty years earlier, 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, in a 1919 opinion, concluded 
                                                                                                                  
74 See Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II.B., 38 Stat. 114, 168 (excluding from taxable 
income “the compensation . . . of the judges of the supreme and inferior courts of the United 
States now in office”). It was only the compensation of judges as judges that was exempted. 
Congress apparently had no doubt that a judge’s income from other sources—interest, divi-
dends, compensation for nonjudicial activities—could be taxed. The Compensation Clause, by 
its terms, prevents diminution only of “a Compensation” that was “receive[d] for [the judges’] 
Services.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. And the Supreme Court later agreed. See Evans, 253 U.S. at 
263 (“Apart from his salary, a federal judge is as much within the taxing power as other men 
are . . . . If he has an income other than his salary, it also may be taxed in the same way.”). 
75 The 1894 income tax was held to have been a direct tax that was not apportioned among 
the states on the basis of population, as required by the direct-tax clauses. Pollock v. Farmers’ 
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); see JENSEN, TAXING POWER, 
supra note 13, at 45-49. 
76 After the Court rejected the 1894 income tax, the Sixteenth Amendment removed 
“taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,” from the direct-tax apportionment require-
ment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. But early post-Amendment Congresses took a restrained view 
of what could be included in “income.” For example, Congress did not try to tax dividends 
representing distribution of pre-1913 corporate earnings, although the Supreme Court later 
suggested that would have been permissible. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 204 
(1920). And Congress did not try to tax appreciation in the value of property from the pre-1913 
period, even if realization of the appreciation occurred after ratification of the Amendment. See 
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (providing that basis of “property 
acquired before March 1, 1913, [would be] the fair market price or value of such property as of 
that date”). 
77 Act of February 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065. 
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that there should be no constitutional problem when an income tax of 
general application happened to reach judges as well: 
[A tax] diminishes the amount which the official has for other 
uses after discharging the obligations which, in common with 
other citizens, he owes the Government . . . . This results, 
however, not because Congress has diminished the amount of 
his compensation, but because . . . there has merely been an 
increase in the purposes to which that compensation, when 
received, must be devoted.78 
Not everyone was convinced, however. Walter Evans, who was 
appointed to the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Kentucky in 1899,79 long before the effective date of the Act—and, 
for that matter, long before the Sixteenth Amendment began its move 
through state legislatures in 1909—challenged the application of the 
Revenue Act to him. That dispute culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
1920 decision in Evans v. Gore.80 
The Supreme Court concluded that, because of the Compensation 
Clause, the tax was invalid as it applied to Judge Evans. Despite a 
dissent from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in which Justice Louis 
Brandeis concurred,81 the majority opinion reads as if the case were a 
no-brainer. No diminution in compensation means no income tax, 
wrote Justice Willis Van Devanter; it means “the judge shall have a 
                                                                                                                  
78 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 475, 487-88 (1919). 
79 Judge Evans was initially appointed to the United States District Court for the District 
of Kentucky and was reassigned to the Western District when it was created in 1901. Federal 
Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj 
(last visited May 19, 2006). 
80 253 U.S. 245 (1920). 
81 Holmes thought the tax would have been valid anyway, see id. at 265 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting), but he also suggested that the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment should have 
removed all doubt, by permitting an unapportioned tax on incomes “from whatever source 
derived.” Id. at 267. We doubt the significance of Holmes’s alternative argument. As Justice 
Van Devanter pointed out in the majority opinion, there was substantial evidence that the 
Amendment was not intended to overturn preexisting immunities from taxation. Id. at 260-63. 
New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes raised just such a question, in initially resisting his 
state’s ratification of the Amendment, because he feared the Amendment might have overturned 
the understanding that state and local bond interest could not be reached by an unapportioned 
income tax. The Evans Court noted that Hughes’s concern “promptly brought forth from states-
men who participated in proposing the Amendment such convincing expositions of its pur-
pose . . . that the apprehension was effectively dispelled and ratification followed.” Id. at 261. 
Such interest could be taxed today (although Congress has not done so, see I.R.C. §103 (2000)) 
because of a change in intergovernmental immunity law, not because the Court changed its view 
of what the Amendment did: “The legislative history . . . shows that . . . the sole purpose of [the 
Amendment] was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were other-
wise taxable.” South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 522 n.12 (1988); see JENSEN, TAXING 
POWER, supra note 13, at 177-78 (discussing the development of the intergovernmental immu-
nity doctrine and its relationship to taxes on state and municipal bonds). 
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sure and continuing right to the compensation, whereon he 
confidently may rely for his support during his continuance in office, 
so that he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this regard 
may be changed to his disadvantage.”82 That was so regardless of 
whether the tax reached officials in the other branches of government 
and regardless of whether it was a tax that applied generally: “The 
prohibition is general, contains no excepting words and appears to be 
directed against all diminution . . . .”83 
At no point did the Court make a serious effort to explain what the 
danger to the judiciary was from an income tax of general application. 
The Court quoted extensively from many of the usual suspects con-
cerning judicial independence, but it did not tie that discussion to the 
particulars of the case before it.84 The fact that there was no discrimi-
nation against the judiciary or particular judges was deemed irrele-
vant: “If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can 
find no justification in the taxation of other income as to which there 
is no prohibition; for, of course, doing what the Constitution permits 
gives no license to do what it prohibits.”85 
B. Miles v. Graham 
In Evans, the Court had not seemed to rely on the fact that Judge 
Evans was already sitting when the Revenue Act of 1918 went into 
effect, but some suggested that might have been crucial to the result. 
The Court had said in Evans that all laws, including taxing statutes, 
“which by their necessary operation and effect withhold or take from 
the judge a part of which has been promised by law for his services 
must be regarded as within the prohibition.”86 If a judge assumes of-
fice after a tax is already on the books, however, what possible claim 
is there that his compensation has been diminished by the tax?87 In 
deciding whether to take the job, the prospective judge could have 
considered the effect of the tax in calculating his future economic 
position. He should have known what he was getting into, that is, and 
tax-free compensation would not have been “promised by law” to 
him. 
                                                                                                                  
82 Evans, 253 U.S. at 249. 
83 Id. at 245. 
84 See id. at 249-53 (highlighting, among other things, Alexander Hamilton’s statements 
on the need for judicial independence). 
85 Id. at 244-45. 
86 Id. at 254 (emphasis added). 
87 See 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 1.2.7 (3d ed. 1999). 
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In 1925, the Supreme Court, in Miles v. Graham,88 dealt with this 
leftover question, and did so in a questionable way. Judge Samuel 
Graham’s appointment to the old United States Court of Claims was 
effective September 1, 1919, after the Revenue Act of 1918 was in 
place. So, asked Justice James McReynolds, “Does the circumstance 
that [Graham’s] appointment came after the taxing Act require a dif-
ferent view concerning his right to exemption?”89 The answer (for all 
but Justice Louis Brandeis, who dissented without opinion90) was no: 
The words and history of the clause indicate that the pur-
pose was to impose upon Congress the duty definitely to de-
clare what sum shall be received by each judge out of the 
public funds and the times for payment. When this duty has 
been complied with the amount specified becomes the com-
pensation which is protected against diminution during his 
continuance in office.91 
One might ask: What words? What history? The evidence was not 
there, but Justice McReynolds nevertheless concluded that, because 
the applicable statute said Judge Graham was to have been paid 
$7,500, Graham should have been left with $7,500 after taxes. All 
Article III judges, whether or not they were on the bench when the 
income tax went into effect, were exempted from application of the 
income tax. 
As events unfolded, Miles v. Graham was “the law,” at least for a 
while, but the Supreme Court had not addressed an important thresh-
old question (which the government had not raised): Was the Court of 
Claims an Article III court to which the Compensation Clause ap-
plied? If it was not—if it was an Article I court, as the Supreme Court 
determined a few years later92—the Clause was irrelevant, compensa-
tion could be diminished without constitutional problems, and no 
legal issue should have remained. 
                                                                                                                  
88 268 U.S. 501 (1925). 
89 Id. at 508. 
90 Id. at 509. Justice Brandeis was presumably adhering to Justice Holmes’s dissenting 
opinion in Evans, in which he had concurred. We do not know why Justice Holmes departed 
from his position in that case and acquiesced in Miles. 
91 Id. at 508-09. 
92 See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (holding that the Compensation 
Clause does not apply to Court of Claims judges). In Williams, the Court noted, as it had in 
another case considering the constitutional status of the Court of Claims, that the issue had not 
been raised in Miles. Id. at 568-69 (citing Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1929), 
which held that a case or controversy was not a requirement for an Article I court like the Court 
of Claims). It was not until 1953 that Congress made the Court of Claims officially an Article 
III court. See Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, § 1, 67 Stat. 226, 226. 
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One of the peculiar, but predictable, effects of the holdings in Ev-
ans and Miles was that judges had an incentive to stay on the bench 
longer than would otherwise have been the case.93 If a judge com-
pletely retired from the bench, he lost the tax exemption and other 
benefits of the Compensation Clause, as the Clause had been inter-
preted in those cases. We can illustrate the point with reference to 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s experience, although we do not 
mean to suggest that tax considerations actually influenced his think-
ing about retirement. Holmes resigned on January 12, 1932, at age 91. 
His retirement income then became subject to the income tax,94 and 
shortly thereafter, in an economy move, Congress reduced retirement 
compensation for judges.95 Had Holmes remained on the bench, his 
compensation could not have been lowered.96  
For those concerned about an out-of-touch judiciary, this was not a 
good signal to send to judges whose retirement would have freed up 
judicial slots. With that consideration in mind, legislation was intro-
duced, before President Franklin Roosevelt resorted to his Court-
                                                                                                                  
93 A similar incentive had existed during the time, before 1869, when federal judges were 
provided no pension upon retirement. See Charles Fairman, The Retirement of Federal Judges, 
51 HARV. L. REV. 397, 419 (1938) (“To make no provision for salary after resignation in the 
case of a judge enjoying tenure for life was precisely the way to keep him on the bench to the 
end.”). 
94 Holmes was not immune from tax incentives—and from tax hypocrisy as well. He is 
known for stressing the relationship between taxation and civilization. See, e.g., Letter from 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski (May 12, 1930), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 
316, 319 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Atheneum ed. 1963) (1953) (“I always say that I pay my 
tax bills more readily than any others—for whether the money is well or ill spent I get civilized 
society for it.”). However, because of Evans v. Gore, Holmes was not required to pay taxes on 
his judicial income. He thus received a discount on his bill for civilization, and other American 
taxpayers had to make up the difference. To his credit, Holmes had dissented in Evans—he 
thought he should be taxed on his judicial income—but he did not contribute his tax savings 
attributable to Evans to the federal treasury. 
95 See Legislative Appropriations Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 107(a)(5), 47 Stat. 382, 
401-02 (reducing “salaries and retired pay” of judges earning over $10,000 annually, but ex-
empting those “whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during 
their continuance in office”). 
96 See THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME 
COURT CLERK IN FDR’S WASHINGTON 163 n.9 (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 
2002) [hereinafter KNOX]. It was assumed that retirement income was not constitutionally 
protected. See Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1934, ch. 101, § 13, 48 Stat. 283, 307 
(1933) (reducing “the retired pay of judges (whose compensation, prior to retirement or resigna-
tion, could not, under the Constitution, have been diminished)” by fifteen percent). The “retire-
ment or resignation” language in the Act was intended to distinguish between what we would 
today call a senior judge, someone who has “retired” but still performs judicial duties, and a 
judge who has entirely left the bench (i.e., “resigned”). The 1933 reduction was aimed at the 
“retired pay” of both. Soon afterward, however, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could 
not reduce the income of a “retired” judge who still performed judicial duties. Booth v. United 
States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934). Implicit in the decision was the proposition that a reduction in 
retired pay would be constitutionally permissible for a judge who had totally resigned. But see 
infra note 198 and accompanying text (suggesting that deferred compensation perhaps might be 
subject to the Compensation Clause). 
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packing plan, to provide a guaranteed income, tax-free, for any retir-
ing justice.97 The goal was to create openings on the Supreme Court 
that could be filled with New Deal-friendly justices. Other events 
sidetracked the Court-packing plan, of course. And the guaranteed-
income legislation also became unnecessary after the Court’s 1939 
decision in O’Malley v. Woodrough,98 which eliminated any basis for 
a constitutional distinction between the nondiscriminatory taxation of 
pre-retirement compensation of federal judges and the similar taxa-
tion of post-retirement compensation. We return to taxation and re-
tirement in the final part of this article. 
C. O’Malley v. Woodrough 
In 1939, the Court revisited the Compensation Clause in O’Malley. 
In the Revenue Act of 1932, Congress had provided—Miles v. Gra-
ham notwithstanding—that the statutory term “gross income” would 
include compensation of “judges of courts of the United States taking 
office after [June 6, 1932].”99 (It was not until 1954 that statutory 
provisions specifically taxing judicial salaries were eliminated as sur-
plusage.100) Judge Joseph Woodrough, fitting within that defined 
category,101 brought suit, reasonably arguing that, under Miles v. Gra-
ham, the tax could not be applied to federal judges. 
The difference between the Court’s analysis in the two cases from 
the 1920s and that in 1939 is the difference between night and day. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter reexamined the Compensation Clause, con-
cluding that the Evans Court had gotten it wrong: “[T]he meaning 
which Evans v. Gore imputed to the history which explains Article 
III, § 1, was contrary to the way in which it was read by other Eng-
lish-speaking courts.”102 The tax at issue did not affect judicial inde-
pendence, which is what the Clause is about: 
To suggest that [the tax] makes inroads upon the independ-
ence of judges who took office after Congress had thus 
charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by mak-
                                                                                                                  
97 See KNOX, supra note 96, at 163 & n.9. 
98 307 U.S. 277 (1939). 
99 Ch. 209, § 22(a), 47 Stat. 169, 178, reenacted by Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(a), 
49 Stat. 1648, 1657. 
100 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954); 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra 
note 87, ¶ 1.2.7. 
101 Woodrough had become a judge on the United States District Court for the District of 
Nebraska in 1916 and was named to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 
1933, after the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1932. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the 
United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited May 19, 2006). 
102 O’Malley, 307 U.S. at 281. 
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ing them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining 
the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience 
on which the framers based the safeguards of Article III, 
§ 1.103 
Furthermore, it obviously irritated the Court (other than dissenting 
Justice Pierce Butler104 and presumably Justice James McReynolds, 
the author of Miles, who did not participate in O’Malley) that Judge 
Woodrough was trying to avoid the obligations of ordinary citizens. 
Judges ought to pay their “aliquot share” of the costs of civilization: 
“To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges 
are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does 
not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the 
material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they 
are charged with administering.”105 
To be sure, one sentence quoted above alludes to the fact that 
Judge Woodrough was appointed after the tax was extended to 
members of the judiciary,106 and the Court in O’Malley could 
conceivably have left Evans intact while repudiating only Miles. The 
Court could have decided, that is, that an income tax could reach 
judges who took office after the tax’s enactment, while reserving 
reconsideration of whether the tax might also apply to already sitting 
judges. But that was not what the Court did. A fair reading of Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion shows that the allusion to the time of 
Woodrough’s appointment merely reflected the particulars of the 
lawsuit. Nothing in O’Malley supported a constitutional distinction, 
for tax purposes, between incumbent judges and new judges. Justice 
Frankfurter began his discussion by condemning the approach taken 
in Evans, and the rest of his analysis applied to all judges—whenever 
they were appointed. 
The reasoning in O’Malley was totally inconsistent with that in 
Evans and Miles, but Justice Frankfurter said nothing directly about 
the continuing vitality of Evans, and he could not even bring himself 
to say that Miles had been entirely overturned. Frankfurter wrote only 
that “to the extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                  
103 Id. at 282. 
104 Justice Butler filed a lengthy dissent, citing the nineteenth-century history as well as the 
two earlier twentieth-century cases. Id. at 277. One of his primary arguments, derived from 
Evans v. Gore—an argument we take up in Part V—was that judicial independence was only 
one of the purposes of the Compensation Clause. The Clause was also intended, Butler argued, 
as an economic incentive to attract talent to the federal bench. Id. at 292. 
105 Id. at 282. 
106 See supra text accompanying note 103. 
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what was said in Miles v. Graham, the latter cannot survive.”107 Miles 
was clearly rejected in its entirety, however, and Frankfurter’s logic 
could not be limited to that decision. Because Miles rested exclusively 
on Evans, the repudiation of Miles necessarily eviscerated Evans as 
well.108 
D. United States v. Will 
This interpretation of O’Malley was confirmed in 1980, in United 
States v. Will.109 Pointing to Justice Frankfurter’s statement in 
O’Malley that “to the extent Miles v. Graham was inconsistent, it 
‘cannot survive,’” the Will Court noted the obvious: “Because Miles 
relied on Evans v. Gore, O’Malley must also be read to undermine the 
reasoning of Evans . . . .”110 
As mentioned earlier, Will was not a tax case. The Court in Will 
held that certain retroactive cancellations of scheduled (and already 
effective) cost-of-living raises for federal judges violated the 
Compensation Clause, even though the cancellations affected 
members of other governmental branches as well. The Court wrote: 
“The inclusion in the freeze of other officials who are not protected 
by the Compensation Clause does not insulate a direct diminution in 
judges’ salaries from the clear mandate of that Clause; 
the Constitution makes no exceptions for ‘nondiscriminatory’ 
reductions.”111 
Thus, in the nontax context, when a “direct diminution” is in-
volved, it is irrelevant to Compensation Clause analysis whether 
Congress discriminated against the judiciary: any diminution is im-
permissible. But with taxes, discrimination seemed to be crucial to a 
claim under the Clause. As the Court explained, Will was “quite dif-
ferent from the situation in O’Malley. There the Court held that the 
Compensation Clause was not offended by an income tax levied on 
Article III judges as well as on all taxpayers; there was no discrimina-
                                                                                                                  
107 O’Malley, 307 U.S. at 282-83 (citation omitted). 
108 If Evans had remained good law after O’Malley, the Compensation Clause might have 
required the maintenance of the real, rather than the nominal, value of judicial salaries. But the 
Court of Claims, relying heavily on O’Malley, rejected this argument in a case brought by a 
group of Article III judges whose salaries had declined in real terms by 34.4 percent over a six-
year period. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see Rosenn, supra note 24 
(discussing Atkins and the decline of judicial salaries in real terms); cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, A 
Few Modest Proposals To Reform the Law Governing Federal Judicial Salaries, PROF. LAW., 
Fall 2000, at 1, 4 (arguing that “even if Article III does not mandate cost of living increases as a 
matter of constitutional law, still, as a matter of policy and fairness, judicial salaries should be 
adjusted for inflation automatically”). 
109 449 U.S. 200 (1980). 
110 Id. at 227 n.31 (citation omitted). 
111 Id. at 226. 
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tion against the plaintiff judge.”112 Judges are citizens, too: “In 
O’Malley this Court held that the immunity in the Compensation 
Clause would not extend to exempting judges from paying taxes, a 
duty shared by all citizens. The Court thus recognized that the Com-
pensation Clause does not forbid everything that might adversely af-
fect judges.”113 
Congress may not directly reduce judicial salaries, but it can 
eliminate planned raises that have not yet taken effect. Were Congress 
to provide for automatic cost-of-living increases, for example, it 
should not be locked in to the adjustment formula for decades. If the 
Compensation Clause altogether precluded a downward adjustment, a 
formula would presumably have to apply to judges sitting when the 
formula was enacted until they leave the bench. In Will, the Supreme 
Court said that tying Congress’s hands in that way would be ab-
surd.114 In Will itself, the Court upheld prospective cancellation of 
other pay raises for judges, as well as high-level executive officials 
and members of Congress, that had not yet vested.115  
                                                                                                                  
112 Id. (citation omitted). 
113 Id. at 227 n.31 (citation omitted). 
114 Id. at 228 (“To say that Congress could not alter a method of calculating salaries before 
it was executed would mean the Judicial Branch could command Congress to carry out an 
announced future intent as to a decision the Constitution vests exclusively in the Congress.”). 
115 Id. at 229. Deciding when an increase in compensation has vested depends on the par-
ticulars of the situation. In several appropriation acts—in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999—
Congress blocked otherwise automatic, annual adjustments in judicial salary that had been 
provided for in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716. Vermeule, 
supra note 6, at 524. Under the original scheme, “once Congress decided in any particular year 
to award a COLA to employees on the ‘General Schedule’—essentially Civil Ser-
vice employees—then a COLA would automatically become payable to federal judges as well.” 
Id. But Congress then blocked the raises that would have applied to judges in the years in ques-
tion. Several judges who had been sitting when the Ethics Reform Act was enacted brought suit. 
Although a district court judge granted summary judgment in their favor, the Federal Circuit 
reversed, distinguishing Will. Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 1999), 
rev’d, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 911 (2002). The Federal Circuit 
characterized the required analysis as looking to the “timing of the repeal action rather than the 
‘automatic’ or ‘discretionary’ nature of the planned pay raise.” Williams, 240 F.3d at 1029. 
Thus, “if Congress and the President wish to prevent a planned increase in judicial compensa-
tion, they must do so before the date that the pay increase becomes actually ‘due and payable’ as 
part of the judges’ compensation package.” Id.; see Vermeule, supra note 6, at 524-27 (discuss-
ing Williams and when pay raises should be treated as having vested). 
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of differences between Will and Williams. Suf-
fice it to say that, while the congressional actions at issue in Williams were suspect under Will, 
the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Williams, 535 U.S. 911. Justice Breyer (who in 
2001 had written the majority opinion in United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001)—to be 
discussed in Part III.E) wrote a vigorous dissent from the denial of certiorari, in which two 
other justices joined. Id. at 911-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer insisted that the judges had 
raised a serious argument that, because of the different procedures used to determine cost-of-
living adjustments in the two situations, judicial expectations about compensation were stronger 
in Williams than in Will. Id. at 917. If Breyer was right, Williams might have presented a 
stronger case than Will for invoking the Compensation Clause. 
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E. United States v. Hatter 
As was true in O’Malley, the Supreme Court in Will—although it 
had nothing good to say about Evans—forwent the opportunity to 
state unequivocally that the old case had been overruled. That brings 
us to United States v. Hatter,116 in which the status of Evans could no 
longer be ignored. 
Judge Terry Hatter of the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California and several other federal judges sued in 
1989, challenging the application to them of the wage taxes that fund 
the Social Security old-age, survivors, and disability insurance 
(OASDI) program and the Medicare hospital insurance program. 
Prior to 1983, most federal employees, including judges, were exempt 
from Social Security taxes because of the retirement systems estab-
lished by the federal government on their behalf. But the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 subjected basically all federal 
employees, including federal judges, to the Medicare tax,117 and the 
Social Security Amendments of 1983 imposed the OASDI wage tax 
on judges and a few other select governmental officials.118 Hatter and 
the other judges party to the suit were already on the bench when the 
wage taxes became effective—hence the claim that their compensa-
tion was being unconstitutionally diminished. 
The suit focused on the effect of the Social Security taxes on fed-
eral judges, but the statutory changes were not intended to subject the 
judges to any special, deleterious treatment. Congress was trying to 
increase revenue for the Social Security system, and the changes also 
imposed the wage taxes for the first time on many other federal offi-
cials, including the president, the vice president, cabinet members, 
and members of Congress. The statutory changes had the effect of 
treating most federal officials, including judges, in the same way 
other American citizens had been treated for decades—nothing like 
the discrimination that Will had implied was necessary for a Compen-
sation Clause claim involving taxation. Furthermore, if Congress 
could have included judges in the Social Security system to begin 
with—and O’Malley should have removed any doubt on that score—
surely Congress should not have been precluded from legislating to 
correct its earlier excess of caution. Or should it? 
                                                                                                                  
116 532 U.S. 557 (2001). 
117 Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 278, 96 Stat. 324, 559-63 (amending I.R.C. § 3121). 
118 Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 101(b)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 69 (amending I.R.C. § 3121). 
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1. Why Did the Supreme Court Bother to Hear Hatter? 
A threshold question was whether any issue in Hatter was serious 
enough to justify an expenditure of Supreme Court time. Yes, there 
was some plausibility to the judges’ Compensation Clause claim be-
cause the legislation extending the OASDI tax singled out a set of 
government officials, including judges, for unhappy consequences, 
and that action was superficially discriminatory. Furthermore, Evans 
v. Gore had not been formally overruled. Nevertheless, many com-
mentators, including the two of us, thought that O’Malley and Will 
pointed to only one possible conclusion: of course these taxes were 
permissible!119 
Everything Justice Frankfurter had said in O’Malley about the pur-
poses of the Compensation Clause suggested that the intellectual 
foundation for Evans had been destroyed, and the Court in Will 
seemed to have agreed. Evans and O’Malley were irreconcilable, and 
Frankfurter’s failure in O’Malley to state explicitly that Evans had 
been overruled reflected judicial caution, nothing more.120 Besides, 
several lower courts had remarked on the apparent demise of Evans 
despite the Supreme Court’s failure to repudiate the case explicitly.121 
                                                                                                                  
119 See supra note 13. 
120 A similar situation occurred when the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The 
Brown Court simply “rejected” statements in Plessy that were contrary to “modern 
[psychological] authority,” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95, and “conclude[d] that in the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” Id. at 495. Nevertheless, 
many subsequent cases have said what everyone thinks was the case, that Brown really did 
overrule Plessy. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 191 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. 
Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 152 n.6 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133 (1970). Brown did to Plessy what O’Malley did to Evans. 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to overrule moribund precedents has not prevented lower 
courts from recognizing their lack of vitality. Indeed, the lower court in the case that led to the 
end of the Montgomery bus boycott was quite confident that Plessy had not survived Brown. 
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.) (3-judge court), aff’d per curiam, 352 
U.S. 903 (1956); see also Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 
1942) (3-judge court) (declining to follow the two-year-old precedent of Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), because of evidence that the Supreme Court no longer regarded that 
ruling as sound even though the Court had not formally interred it), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
See generally Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action 
by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 61-69 (1982) (providing other 
examples of “anticipatory overruling” by lower courts).  
121 E.g., Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that the 
Court in O’Malley and Will “came as close to overruling [Evans] as it could without actually 
uttering the word”); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1043 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en banc) 
(characterizing Evans as “no longer good law”); id. at 1044 (observing that O’Malley “by force 
of reasoning overruled a good deal of Evans”); id. at 1045 (referring to the “overruling” of 
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Indeed, it was actually because Evans was on such shaky ground 
that the Supreme Court had to act in Hatter. For better or for worse, 
the Court had recently insisted that lower courts follow all high court 
precedents, however fragile they might appear, until the justices 
themselves apply the coup de grâce.122 The absence of “the magic 
word ‘overruled’”123 in O’Malley could not have resurrected Evans 
intellectually, but the Federal Circuit was merely obeying orders in 
concluding that it had to follow Evans.124 Under the circumstances, 
the Supreme Court had to hear Hatter if only to utter the magic word 
and to remove all doubt about the continuing vitality of Evans. 
2. The Merits 
Overruling Evans is one of the things the Supreme Court did in 
Hatter. But the Court went beyond that simple, long overdue step, 
and it did so in a controversial way. Hatter turned out to involve more 
than simply correcting a judicial mistake of long ago.  
Hatter bounced up and down in the federal judicial system for a 
decade, and eight opinions were issued before the Supreme Court 
became involved substantively.125 Much of the case’s procedural his-
tory was complex—raising questions such as who could hear the 
case126 and the implications of the Supreme Court’s inability to mus-
ter a quorum when the case had been brought there at an earlier 
stage127—but the fundamental, substantive issue was straightforward. 
                                                                                                                  
 
Evans in O’Malley). 
122 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (reaffirming “that ‘if a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other 
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to 
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions’” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))). 
123 Acker, 210 F.3d at 1320. 
124 See Hatter v. United States, 64 F.3d 647, 650 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d as if by an equally 
divided Court, 519 U.S. 801 (1996). 
125 For the complete procedural history, see United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 564-65 
(2001). 
126 At the time Hatter was being decided, at least 10 suits involving almost 100 other fed-
eral judges with similar claims were in the pipeline. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. L, 
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001) (No. 99-1978). No members of the Supreme Court 
were parties to Hatter or any of the other cases. See id.; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court 
Roundup: Court To Review Benefits Tax on U.S. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at A29. 
127 Four justices recused themselves when the case reached the Court in 1996, see United 
States v. Hatter, 519 U.S. 801 (1996), apparently because they might have been “entitled to 
refunds if the plaintiffs’ broadest remedial theory prevail[ed].” Greenhouse, supra note 126 
(noting that only two justices were not participating in 2001, presumably because the passage of 
time left them as the only members of the Court with a potential financial stake in the outcome). 
Because of the four recusals in 1996, the Court lacked a quorum of six participating members. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The absence of a quorum had the effect of affirming, as if by an 
equally divided Court, the Federal Circuit’s 1995 ruling (64 F.3d 647) that the extension of 
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Under the Compensation Clause, can Congress extend an already 
existing tax of general application to sitting judges who had previ-
ously been exempt from the tax? 
a. Nondiscriminatory Taxation and the Interment of Evans 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court in Hatter tossed the last 
shovelful of dirt on Evans’s grave: “We now overrule Evans insofar 
as it holds that the Compensation Clause forbids Congress to apply a 
generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the salaries of federal 
judges, whether or not they were appointed before enactment of the 
tax.”128 Six of the seven participating justices (O’Connor and Stevens 
were recused) voted to overturn Evans. In his opinion concurring on 
the OASDI tax issue but dissenting on the Medicare tax, Justice 
Scalia wrote, “The Court’s decision today simply recognizes what 
should be obvious: that Evans has not only been undermined, but has 
in fact collapsed.”129 Only Justice Thomas thought Evans had been 
rightly decided.130 
Also not surprisingly, the Court, over the dissents of Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, upheld the application of the Medicare tax to 
federal judges. All Congress had done with the Medicare tax was to 
make almost all government officials, including judges, subject to the 
tax. Nothing in the process even hinted at an attempt to treat the judi-
ciary in an especially unhappy way. 
But the Court in Hatter provided one big surprise. The Court held 
that the extension of the OASDI tax to those judges sitting in 1983 
was in fact discriminatory and, therefore, invalid under the Compen-
sation Clause, even though Congress had not intended to single out 
the judiciary for unfavorable treatment. All seven participating jus-
tices thought the OASDI tax was constitutionally infirm as applied to 
                                                                                                                  
 
Social Security taxes to incumbent Article III judges violated the Compensation Clause. 28 
U.S.C. § 2109 (2000). Although an affirmance by an equally divided Court has no precedential 
significance, such a disposition is said to be “conclusive and binding” on the parties. United 
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113 
(1868). The Court’s 1996 disposition might therefore have represented the law of the case in 
Hatter. On the other hand, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies “only with respect to issues 
previously determined,” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979), and the 1996 order 
under § 2109 was not an adjudication of the merits that would trigger that doctrine. Cf. Hughes 
Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 365 n.1 (1973) (finding that an earlier 
dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted was not the law of the case); Neil v. Biggers, 
409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (refusing to treat the prior affirmance of a state conviction by an 
equally divided Court as precluding the defendant from raising a federal habeas corpus claim). 
128 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 567. 
129 Id. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
130 See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
Fo
r a
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
co
py
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
pe
r, 
pl
ea
se
 v
isi
t: 
ht
tp
://
ss
rn
.c
om
/a
bs
tra
ct
=9
41
15
8
  
2006]   TAXATION, COMPENSATION, AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 995 
 
Judge Hatter and other judges sitting in 1983.131 And the infirmity of 
the tax, concluded the Court, was not cured by later increases in judi-
cial compensation.132 
The most important part of Hatter was the repudiation, once and 
for all, of Evans v. Gore and the acceptance of the proposition that the 
Compensation Clause affects only those taxes that discriminate 
against the judiciary. As Justice Breyer wrote for the Court, “In our 
view, the Clause does not prevent Congress from imposing a ‘non-
discriminatory tax laid generally’ upon judges and other citizens, but 
it does prohibit taxation that singles out judges for specially unfavor-
able treatment.”133 
Hatter thus confirmed that, when taxation is involved, the Com-
pensation Clause analysis is different from that applied in Will. Will 
had concluded that Congress may not directly reduce vested judicial 
salaries, even if done as part of a nondiscriminatory cost-cutting 
move. With taxation, however, the only concern is whether there has 
been discrimination against the judiciary in a way that might damage 
judicial independence. As Justice Breyer wrote in Hatter, 
There is no good reason why a judge should not share the tax 
burdens borne by all citizens. We concede that this Court [in 
Will] has held that the Legislature cannot directly reduce ju-
dicial salaries even as part of an equitable effort to reduce all 
Government salaries. But a tax law . . . affects compensation 
indirectly, not directly. And those prophylactic considerations 
that may justify an absolute rule forbidding direct salary re-
ductions are absent here . . . . In practice, the likelihood that a 
nondiscriminatory tax represents a disguised legislative effort 
to influence the judicial will is virtually nonexistent. Hence, 
the potential threats to judicial independence that underlie the 
Constitution’s compensation guarantee cannot justify a spe-
                                                                                                                  
131 Since the Federal Circuit had also concluded that the OASDI tax was invalid in its ap-
plication to Judge Hatter and friends, it might seem peculiar to characterize the result at the 
Supreme Court—an affirmance of a lower court decision—as a “surprise.” The result was 
nevertheless surprising because the Federal Circuit had relied on Evans v. Gore in its analysis of 
the Compensation Clause, see Hatter v. United States, 64 F.3d 647, 649-50 (Fed. Cir. 1995), 
aff’d as if by an equally divided Court, 519 U.S. 801 (1996), and nearly everyone viewed that 
case as a legal dead letter. 
132 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 578-81. 
133 Id. at 561 (quoting O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 282 (1939)). Five of the 
seven justices agreed with this proposition. Justices Scalia and Thomas both thought the Clause 
could forbid an increase in tax burdens that is nondiscriminatory in nature. See infra notes 148-
52 and accompanying text. 
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cial judicial exemption from a commonly shared tax, not even 
as a preventive measure to counter those threats.134 
If a tax does not discriminate against the judiciary, there should be no 
constitutional problem.135 
b. Was the Extension of the OASDI Tax Discriminatory? 
We agree that the Compensation Clause should be irrelevant to 
nondiscriminatory taxes, but the Court also concluded that the exten-
sion of the OASDI tax to sitting judges—the elimination of a tax ex-
emption to which judges had previously been entitled—was in fact 
discriminatory. As Justice Breyer’s majority opinion explained, “In 
our view, the Clause . . . prohibit[s] taxation that singles out judges 
for specially unfavorable treatment”136—and this was a case of “spe-
cially unfavorable” treatment.137 
The conclusion that discrimination was involved came as the result 
of a complicated, four-step analysis presented by Justice Breyer. First, 
because of retirement plans already in place, federal employees had 
been outside the Social Security system before enactment of the 1983 
changes. Second, the 1983 changes did not increase the financial 
obligations of nearly all (96 percent) of the federal employees in 
office at that time because those employees were given the choice 
whether to enter the Social Security system or not. (Newly hired 
employees had no option.) While in form the remaining 4 percent of 
the federal employees seemed to have no such choice, it was in fact 
only the federal judges and a few insignificant other officials (like the 
president138)—people whose government retirement plans were 
noncontributory—who were hurt financially by the 1983 changes in 
the law.139 Third, the federal judges had to pay more, and got nothing 
                                                                                                                  
134 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 571 (citations omitted). 
135 But see infra Part V (discussing second possible justification for Compensation Clause). 
136 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 561. 
137 Justice Scalia thought discrimination was unnecessary to invalidate a tax under the 
Compensation Clause, see infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text, and Justice Thomas 
apparently thought that any income tax unconstitutionally diminishes judicial compensation. See 
infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
138 As Justice Breyer wrote for the Court: 
The President’s pension is noncontributory. And the President himself, like the 
judges, is protected against diminution in his “[c]ompensation.” These facts may 
help establish congressional good faith. But, as we have said, we do not doubt that 
good faith. And we do not see why, otherwise, the separate and special example of 
that single individual, the President, should make a critical difference here. 
Hatter, 532 U.S. at 577-78 (citations omitted). That single individual indeed! 
139 The retirement plan for judges is noncontributory, wrote Justice Breyer, because the 
Constitution permits judges to “draw a salary for life simply by continuing to serve. That fact 
means that a contributory system, in all likelihood, would not work.” Id. at 574 (citation omit-
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in return. Because of pre-judicial employment, nearly all were already 
fully insured under the Social Security system. Finally, said the Court, 
the changes did not serve to “‘equaliz[e]’ the retirement-related 
obligations that pre-1983 law imposed upon judges with the 
retirement-related obligations that pre-1983 law imposed upon other 
current high-level federal employees.”140 
To put the Court’s position more simply: federal judges, and (with 
an exception or two, like the president) only federal judges, had in-
creased tax obligations from the 1983 changes, with no compensating 
benefits. That was discriminatory, concluded the Court, and therefore 
inconsistent with the Compensation Clause. 
This is unconvincing. The Court’s analysis required a lengthy se-
ries of steps, and suppositions, to come to the counterintuitive deter-
mination that the statutory effects were discriminatory. The level of 
detail presented by Justice Breyer was extraordinary when, as he ad-
mitted, there was no evidence whatsoever that Congress was acting to 
single out the judiciary for unfortunate consequences, and the effect 
of the legislation was merely to bring the judiciary into the broadly 
applicable Social Security system.141 
Justice Breyer had an answer to these points, of course. He sug-
gested that, if the rules were otherwise, Congress could secretly pun-
ish judges while professing high-minded goals: 
The Government also argues that there is no evidence here 
that Congress singled out judges for special treatment in order 
to intimidate, influence, or punish them. But this court has 
never insisted upon such evidence. To require it is to invite 
legislative efforts that embody, but lack evidence of, some 
such intent, engendering suspicion among the branches and 
consequently undermining that mutual respect that the Con-
                                                                                                                  
 
ted). That likelihood, said Breyer, gave a constitutional dimension to the plan arrangements: 
“The 1983 statute consequently singles out judges for adverse treatment solely because of a 
feature required by the Constitution to preserve judicial independence.” Id. We are not sure why 
it would not have “worked” to have a contributory system for judges; some judges do in fact 
really want to “retire.” In any event, whatever the difficulties with a contributory plan, we do 
not see how a noncontributory plan is “required” by the Constitution. 
140 Id. at 573. 
141 As Professor Vermeule explained:  
Hatter . . . illustrates that distorted judgments and obscurely complex rulings can oc-
cur when the nondiscrimination test is applied with free choice of baselines and 
comparisons. The legislation imposing a Social Security tax treated judges exactly as 
other citizen earners are treated—and was, thus, nondiscriminatory in precisely the 
sense required by precedent. Yet the Court said that other federal employees were 
the appropriate comparison group . . . . 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 532. 
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stitution demands. Nothing in the record discloses anything 
other than benign congressional motives. If the Compensation 
Clause is to offer meaningful protection, however, we cannot 
limit that protection to instances in which the Legislature 
manifests, say, direct hostility to the Judiciary.142 
The posited concern about a vast congressional conspiracy cannot 
be taken seriously. The decision represents formalism—and judicially 
self-serving formalism at that—at its worst.143 It is inconceivable that 
Congress—a group of 535 very independent, very public people—
could ever take an action motivated by such hostility without leaving 
traces along the way. With no evidence at all that judicial hostility 
motivated extension of the OASDI tax, judicial independence was not 
affected one whit by this congressional action. That should have been 
enough to decide the case. 
c. Who Was Responsible for the “Problem” That Implicated the 
Compensation Clause? 
Justice Breyer’s emphasis on the possibility of hidden hostility was 
strange enough, but there was an even more peculiar aspect to the 
Court’s OASDI tax analysis. The congressional step that was held to 
be inconsistent with the Compensation Clause was almost certainly 
related to the Court’s own decisions. 
Now that Hatter has been decided, we know that the OASDI tax 
could have been imposed on federal judges at the same time it was 
imposed on other Americans in 1935. Judicial income can be reached 
by a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax, and the OASDI tax 
could have been structured in a nondiscriminatory way. 
But the Congress that established the Social Security system knew 
nothing of the sort. In 1935, Evans v. Gore was the law, and Congress 
legislated accordingly, with every reason to doubt that taxing judicial 
salaries was permissible.144 When the Court’s understanding of the 
                                                                                                                  
142 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 577 (citation omitted). 
143 The seven justices sitting in the case apparently did not benefit personally from the re-
sult, but their colleagues did. If we are going to conjure conspiracy theories, Hatter seems to 
present a pretty good example of a few justices acting to help their judicial friends. In any event, 
the case illustrates the concerns Professor Vermeule and others have written about—with judges 
responsible for reviewing decisions that affect their own, and their colleagues’, take-home pay. 
See supra note 45. 
144 It was not until 1939 that the Court eviscerated Evans without overruling it. O’Malley 
v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939). Although Miles v. Graham was also still on the books 
when the Social Security system was created, Congress obviously thought it had the power to 
impose a tax that would reach new judges and it had done just that in the Revenue Act of 1932, 
the statute involved in O’Malley. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Congressional 
aggressiveness was limited to new judges, however. After 1932, and until O’Malley was de-
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Compensation Clause changed dramatically, Congress apparently had 
no way to adjust in a constitutionally acceptable way. Once judges 
were deemed exempt, because the Court had misunderstood the 
Compensation Clause, Congress could not extend the taxes to sitting 
judges without having the Court characterize the extension as 
discriminatory.145 
In short, the Supreme Court had put Congress in a Catch-22 situa-
tion—to the benefit of some members of the judiciary. In a very real 
sense, the Court was responsible for the exemption that it said Con-
gress could not eliminate without affecting judicial independence. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE COMPENSATION CLAUSE ON TAXATION 
AFTER HATTER 
Does any of this matter for the future? Will the Compensation 
Clause constrain the national taxing power in any meaningful way? 
We think not.146 Whatever the merits of the Hatter Court’s considera-
tion of the OASDI tax, that analysis should have no effect on the sub-
sequent treatment of taxation under the Compensation Clause. 
As Justice Breyer noted in Hatter, the likelihood that a facially 
nondiscriminatory tax could represent an attack on the judiciary is 
“virtually nonexistent.”147 And a Hatter-like set of facts, involving the 
repeal of a tax exemption for federal judges, is unlikely ever to arise 
again: as far as we know, no similar exemptions remain on the books, 
and Congress is not going to exempt federal judges from any other 
generally applicable tax in the future. We doubt there would be politi-
cal support for such an exemption to begin with, and the result in Hat-
ter, making it difficult for Congress to get rid of an exemption once it 
is on the books, should be an additional deterrent to creating new, 
special treatment for judges. 
Justice Scalia’s partial dissent in Hatter, which concluded that 
application of the Medicare tax as well as the OASDI tax to sitting 
judges violated the Compensation Clause, also appears to be 
irrelevant to future analysis. Scalia criticized the Court’s emphasis on 
                                                                                                                  
 
cided, Congress acted as if taxing already sitting judges were impermissible. 
145 Cf. Vermeule, supra note 6, at 533-34 (noting how a “constitutional” problem was cre-
ated solely because Congress took two steps rather than one to bring judges into the Social 
Security system). 
146 The judges who were sitting when the OASDI tax was extended to the judiciary will 
benefit from the result in Hatter as long as they remain on the bench. In that respect, there are 
future effects from the decision—effects that could continue for two or three more decades. But 
judges taking office after the “discriminatory” extension of the OASDI tax are subject to the tax 
without constitutional problem. 
147 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 571. 
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discrimination, which the Compensation Clause does not mention. 
Instead, he would seek to determine whether a tax exemption has 
become part of judges’ “compensation.”148 Scalia reasoned that “a 
tax-free status conditioned on federal employment is 
compensation,”149 so subjecting sitting judges subject to the Medicare 
tax was impermissible—regardless of the lack of discrimination.150 
But since judges no longer have such arguably “compensatory” tax 
exemptions—and are unlikely to have new ones established—none of 
this should matter for the future. 
With Evans overruled, no longer can anyone seriously argue that 
federal judges are exempt from a generally applicable income tax or 
from, say, an increase in rates under a generally applicable income 
tax. Although Justice Thomas, in a two-sentence opinion in Hatter, 
wrote that the “Court was correct in Evans v. Gore when it held that 
any tax that reduces a judge’s net compensation violates Article III of 
the Constitution,”151 that statement is far removed from the common 
understanding of the last sixty-six years;152 it does not conform to the 
original understanding of the Compensation Clause;153 and it was 
rejected by the six other justices sitting in Hatter. 
All of this leaves the Compensation Clause to prohibit only those 
taxes that clearly discriminate against judges, and serious congres-
sional consideration of discriminatory taxes would be difficult to 
imagine (except for purposes of classroom hypotheticals) even if 
                                                                                                                  
148 Id. at 583-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
149 Id. at 584. 
150 Id. at 584-85. Professor Vermeule too is unhappy with the Hatter majority’s emphasis 
on discrimination: “If Congress may resort to substitutes other than discriminatory taxes, it is 
hard to view the nondiscrimination test as a critical bulwark of judicial independ-
ence.” Vermeule, supra note 6, at 531-32; see id. (describing forms of apparently permissible 
discrimination). But Vermeule’s take is very different from Scalia’s. Vermeule argues that only 
direct reductions in salary are impermissible under the Clause, so that even a discriminatory tax 
directed at judges would be constitutional. Id. at 527-35. In any event, we cannot be comfortable 
with judges determining what is acceptable and what is not: 
The conceptual mistake [in Hatter] is that the Court has taken into account only one 
half of the problem: the need to protect judicial independence from legislative en-
croachment. But the converse risk . . . is that a Compensation Clause enforced by 
judges with personal stakes in the law of judicial compensation will be interpreted in 
excessively judge-protecting ways. 
Id. at 529. 
151 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 586-87 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cita-
tion omitted). 
152 In the context of Hatter, that position meant only that, like Justice Scalia, Justice Tho-
mas thought the Medicare tax should have been struck down as well as the OASDI tax. But the 
implications of Justice Thomas’s statement are astonishing. He seems to be suggesting that 
federal judges are constitutionally exempt from all income tax obligations. One of us has 
stronger originalist leanings than the other, but we both think the idea that the Compensation 
Clause bars application of a tax of general application to federal judges is totally inconsistent 
with the original understanding of the Clause. 
153 See supra Part I. 
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there were no Compensation Clause. The Clause therefore seems 
unlikely ever again to constrain the national taxing power. 
Unless . . . . 
V. BEYOND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COMPENSATION AND  
JUDICIAL RECRUITMENT 
There is always an “unless,” of course. If we are correct, constrain-
ing the taxing power so as to protect judicial independence should 
never again be necessary. But it is possible that, if the Compensation 
Clause has another purpose behind it, that other purpose could be 
implicated by a tax on judicial salaries—even if the tax does not af-
fect judicial independence. 
No one, we think, questions the proposition that the Compensation 
Clause was intended to further judicial independence. And, as we 
argued above, unless there are tax rules favoring federal judges that 
we are unaware of (or unless Congress were to create some special 
tax benefit for judges and then later try to take it away), the Compen-
sation Clause should not constrain Congress’s power to tax in the 
future. Judicial independence is quite simply not going to be impli-
cated by any tax that we can reasonably expect to be imposed.154 
But the Supreme Court has suggested that the Compensation 
Clause serves another purpose as well. By protecting the economic 
position of judges, the Clause helps attract financially driven people 
away from “lucrative pursuits” and to the bench. For example, the 
Court said in Will: 
This Court has recognized that the Compensation Clause 
also serves another, related purpose. As well as promoting ju-
dicial independence, it ensures a prospective judge that, in 
abandoning private practice—more often than not more lucra-
tive than the bench—the compensation of the new post will 
not diminish. Beyond doubt, such assurance has served to at-
tract able lawyers to the bench and thereby enhances the qual-
ity of justice.155 
That echoes Justice Van Devanter’s statement in Evans, hidden 
among the grand pronouncements about judicial independence, that 
                                                                                                                  
154 Yes, the Clause continues to prohibit discriminatory taxation but, because we think that 
openly discriminatory taxation would be inconceivable anyway, we do not think that prohibition 
has any serious effect on real-world behavior. 
155 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1980) (citing Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 
253 (1920), overruled by Hatter, 532 U.S. 557; 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 276 (1826)). 
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“the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to 
benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract 
good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independ-
ence of action and judgment which is essential.”156 Judicial headhunt-
ers need the Compensation Clause to further recruiting. 
We do not think this point about recruiting has been decisive in re-
solving any case,157 but the Court has continued to restate it as if it 
were important. For example, although Hatter overruled Evans, Jus-
tice Breyer wrote, 
Evans properly added that these guarantees of compensa-
tion and life tenure exist, “not to benefit the judges,” but “as a 
limitation imposed in the public interest.” They “promote the 
public weal,” in part by helping to induce “learned” men and 
women “to quit the lucrative pursuits” of the private sector, 
but more importantly by helping to secure an independence of 
mind and spirit necessary if judges are “to maintain that nice 
adjustment between individual rights and governmental pow-
ers which constitutes political liberty.”158 
Judicial independence may be a “more important” consideration, but 
we all benefit, Breyer thought, by having the bench financially attrac-
tive to well-heeled lawyers. 
In his separate opinion in Hatter, Justice Scalia rejected the propo-
sition that the Compensation Clause focuses only on discriminatory 
taxation: “The discrimination criterion that the Court uses would 
make sense if the only purpose of the Compensation Clause were to 
prevent invidious (and possibly coercive) action against judges.”159 
But he went on to endorse the recruitment rationale as well. The 
“public weal” requires that the Clause protect an incentive to “‘quit 
the lucrative pursuits’ of the private sector. That inducement would 
not exist if Congress could cut judicial salaries so long as it did not do 
so discriminatorily.”160  
                                                                                                                  
156 Evans, 253 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added). Dissenting in O’Malley v. Woodrough, Jus-
tice Butler quoted this passage from Evans. O’Malley, 307 U.S. 277, 292 (1939) (Butler, J., 
dissenting). 
157 Because Evans and Miles really had nothing to do with judicial independence, those 
two cases might be considered instances in which another rationale for the Compensation 
Clause must have been controlling. But the Court acted as if judicial independence were in 
jeopardy in both of those cases. 
158 Hatter, 532 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added) (quoting Evans, 253 U.S. at 253, 248; 1 
KENT, supra note 155, at 294; WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 143 (1911)). 
159 Id. at 582-83 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
160 Id. at 583 (quoting Evans, 253 U.S. at 248; 1 KENT, supra note 155, at 294). 
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Judges and potential judges have been complaining about judicial 
salaries since the founding,161 of course, and we assume such com-
plaints will continue until the end of time.162 And, although Professor 
Paul Bator wrote in 1985 that “[f]ederal judges, as a group, complain 
more about their pay than any other group I have ever encoun-
tered,”163 it is not just whining that is involved. The complaints have 
always had some justification. 
In the early years of the Republic, for example, Joseph Story had 
been reluctant to accept his appointment to the Supreme Court be-
cause the judicial salaries in 1811 were exactly what they had been in 
1789.164 Furthermore, Story almost resigned his position, as Professor 
Rosenn noted, “after Congress failed to increase salaries to offset the 
sharp increase in prices caused by the War of 1812.”165 Things did not 
improve as the nineteenth century continued. By 1864, Supreme 
Court justices were earning, in real terms, about three-fourths of what 
justices had been paid in 1789—even though nominal compensation 
had risen over 70 percent during that period.166 And, like other citi-
zens with income above a threshold level, the justices were subject to 
the Civil War income tax, further eroding their economic positions.167 
In the modern era, the complaints about compensation continue to 
have a basis in fact. Between 1969 and 2002, salaries of Supreme 
Court justices declined by 37.3 percent in real terms, and salaries of 
circuit court and district court judges declined by 23.5 percent.168 The 
problem was serious enough that during the 1970s a group of Article 
III judges brought suit claiming that their compensation had been 
                                                                                                                  
161 Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 356. 
162 See Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee [sic] Be Judged Unworthy of a Pay Raise: An 
Examination of the Federal Judicial Salary “Crisis,” 87 MARQ. L. REV. 55, 67 (2003) (provid-
ing examples of judicial complaints). 
163 Paul M. Bator, The Judicial Universe of Judge Richard Posner, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1146, 1148 (1985). 
164 Frank, supra note 162, at 60-61. 
165 Rosenn, supra note 24, at 320. 
166 Id. 
167 The income taxes paid by federal judges were later refunded, but that happened long af-
ter the war was over. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. 
168 Often linked to congressional compensation, judicial salaries stagnate when congress-
men are unwilling to vote themselves increases. See Rosenn, supra note 24, at 309-10; 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY: AN 
UPDATE ON THE URGENT NEED FOR ACTION 4-6 (2003) [hereinafter JUDICIAL PAY], 
http://www.fedbar.org/Federal%20Judicial%20Pay.pdf. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 was 
intended, in part, to make cost-of-living allowances fairly automatic—tying judicial COLAs to 
COLAs provided to civil service employees—but Congress then invalidated some of the in-
creases for federal judges. See supra note 115; see also JUDICIAL PAY, supra, at 9-10 (noting 
that the Ethics Reform Act has functioned poorly in practice). 
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unconstitutionally diminished because their salaries had declined, in 
real terms, by 34.4 percent over a six-year period.169 
No one can reasonably doubt that salary levels can have an effect, 
at the margin, on the composition, and thus the quality, of the federal 
judiciary. For that very reason, Chief Justice William Rehnquist com-
plained about judicial compensation for years, as he unashamedly 
admitted. He noted that, between 1990 and May 2002, more than 70 
Article III judges had left the bench, whereas in the 1960s only a 
“handful” had retired or resigned.170 Not all resignations are for finan-
cial reasons, to be sure171—by far most resigning judges give other 
reasons for their actions172—but some must be.173 And inadequate 
compensation presumably prevents a few first-rate people from even 
considering a judicial position.174 
As real as concerns about judicial compensation may be, we re-
main skeptical that they should be imported into constitutional analy-
sis. Judging is a high calling, and judges should be paid fairly.175 But 
there is something unseemly in judges’ cloaking economic self-
                                                                                                                  
169 The Court of Claims, relying heavily on O’Malley, rejected the constitutional argument. 
See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see also Rosenn, supra note 24 
(discussing Atkins and the decline of judicial salaries). 
170 2002 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2-4 (2003), 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2002year-endreport.html [hereinafter 2002 
YEAR-END REPORT]. His successor, Chief Justice John Roberts, recently stated that 92 judges 
had left the bench since 1990 and that 9 had done so during calendar year 2005. 2005 YEAR-
END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2006), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/ 
year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf. 
171 Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized this but noted that several judges claimed that fi-
nancial reasons played a role. 2002 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 170, at 3. 
172 Professor Van Tassel determined that of the 2,627 resignations between 1789 and 1992, 
only 7 percent were “for reasons other than health or age.” Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 345. “If 
large size and low salary are having an adverse impact on the prestige of the federal judiciary, 
and thus on the desire of people to serve, the negative effects of these circumstances have yet to 
be reflected by large-scale resignations.” Id. at 349. 
173 Professor Van Tassel concluded: 
Over the last 200 years, relatively few judges have explicitly cited low pay as their 
reason for resignation . . . . [O]nly twenty-one judges have actually said as much, but 
forty-nine additional judges returned to private practice or accepted other 
employment. Seventy-one judges resigned to engage in other employment, excluding 
those appointed or elected to other office and those who resigned to run for other 
office but were defeated. It is reasonable to suppose that in some instances salary 
was a factor . . . . 
Id. at 355. 
174 It is probably impossible to study this phenomenon in a systematic way. We hear a few 
stories about fabled jurists who were reluctant to take judicial appointments for financial rea-
sons, see, e.g., supra note 164 and accompanying text; infra note 181 and accompanying text, 
but we have no way of learning about those who said no and did not enter public life at all. See 
Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 358. 
175 Judicial salaries cannot compare to those for the top tier of the practicing bar, but Jus-
tice Breyer suggested that parity with pay for top law professors would be about right. David S. 
Broder, Rehnquist and Breyer Argue for Judicial Pay Increases, WASH. POST, July 16, 2002, at 
A15; Frank, supra note 162, at 119. 
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interest in public-interest garb.176 The Compensation-Clause-as-
recruiting-tool was not part of the original understanding of the 
Clause, and it is not a principle worthy of constitutional status today. 
The Compensation Clause perhaps can have effects on recruiting, 
just as life tenure does, but that was not the reason for the Clause. 
Chancellor James Kent, who is always quoted on this point, was not a 
founder, and, in a passage cited by the Will and Hatter Courts, he 
really did not suggest that recruitment was a purpose of the Clause: 
The provision for the permanent support of the judges is 
well calculated, in addition to the tenure of their office, to 
give them the requisite independence. It tends also to secure a 
succession of learned men on the bench, who, in consequence 
of a certain undiminished support, are enabled and induced to 
quit the lucrative pursuits of private business, for the duties of 
that important station.177 
It was “well calculated” to do one thing—that was the purpose—
and it also “tends” to do something else. We can argue about how 
well that tendency is carried out, and we can discuss whether the ten-
dency is a good thing. But Kent did not say that recruitment was a 
“purpose” of the Clause as originally understood. Removing the pro-
hibition on increases in compensation from the first draft of what 
became the Compensation Clause was intended to make attracting 
qualified judges easier,178 but that is not the same as saying the pur-
pose of the Clause as ratified was to help prospective judges resist the 
enticements of law practice. 
Original understanding may not be everything—the two of us dis-
agree about its importance—but the recruitment rationale is also less 
than persuasive on its own terms. Do we seriously want people as 
federal judges who will have made career decisions based on whether 
or not they would be subject to Social Security taxes, or on similar 
criteria?179 If the Compensation Clause is a critical part of judicial 
                                                                                                                  
176 Unseemliness seems to be inherent in Compensation Clause cases. Consider the follow-
ing from Justice Sutherland:  
[I]t is not extravagant to say that there rests upon every federal judge affected 
nothing less than a duty to withstand any attempt, directly or indirectly in 
contravention of the Constitution, to diminish this compensation, not for his private 
advantage [no, of course not]—which, if that were all, he might willingly forego [of 
course]—but in the interest of preserving unimpaired an essential safeguard adopted 
as a continuing guaranty of an independent judicial administration for the benefit of 
the whole people. 
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1933). 
177 1 KENT, supra note 155, at 294. 
178 See supra text accompanying note 35. 
179 In any event, a potential judge is going to be subject to Social Security taxes whether he 
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recruitment, particularly as the Clause might apply to taxation, there 
is something seriously wrong with the process. 
We are reminded of Benjamin Franklin’s argument at the 
Constitutional Convention that the president should not be paid, 
because compensation would attract the wrong sort of person to the 
job.180 Franklin’s argument was overdone, and more than a little 
unrealistic, but there is something to the proposition that public 
service is its own reward and that attempts to entice those who are not 
interested in public service into the public arena are doomed to 
failure—or so we hope. 
Charles Evans Hughes made a similar point in lectures given in 
1910, the year in which he moved from the New York governorship 
to his first stint on the Supreme Court. Hughes was sensitive to mat-
ters of judicial compensation; around 1897 he had told a “White 
House intimate” that, for financial reasons, he did not want to be con-
sidered for a judicial appointment.181 He certainly did not think that 
judges should work for free, but, he wrote:  
we should be cautious about increasing the chance of drawing 
men to the public service who seek it for the sake of the com-
pensation. It is idle to suppose that emoluments can be given 
which can rival those obtainable by men of first rate ability in 
their lines of chosen effort. Attorneys-general cannot be paid 
what is received by leaders of the bar; heads of banking and 
insurance departments cannot expect the compensation paid 
to the presidents of banks and insurance companies; judges 
must be content to serve for annual pay less in amount than 
may be received in a single case by the lawyers arguing be-
fore them. Men of eminent ability must be found to conduct 
the delicate work of supervising our great public service 
                                                                                                                  
 
takes a judicial post or not. 
180 As Franklin put it: 
And on what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, 
through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of 
parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate, 
the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold 
and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish 
pursuits. 
1 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 82 (statement of Benjamin Franklin) (June 2, 1787). Franklin was 
a proponent of what Professor Vermeule calls “currency effects”: “An argument from currency 
effects supposes that keeping monetary compensation low, or lower than in comparable private 
sector opportunities, will alter the relative importance of cash compensation and in-kind com-
pensation in ways that will select for those who enjoy the job for its own sake, rather than in-
strumentally.” Vermeule, supra note 6, at 536. 
181 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 110 (1951). 
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companies for rewards which are slight in comparison with 
those of the managers and officers of such corporations.182 
Yes, judges should be paid decently, Hughes emphasized; no one 
could have thought otherwise. But “to attract good men and to secure 
efficiency, the honour and independence of the office are of far 
greater account than the emoluments that attach to it.”183 
In any event, what evidence is there that the purported recruiting 
purpose of the Compensation Clause has improved the federal bench? 
When the Court said, “Beyond doubt, such assurance has served to 
attract able lawyers to the bench”184 but cited no empirical support for 
that conclusion, we have reason to be skeptical.185 Besides, the 
Court’s suggestion that lawyers necessarily “abandon” lucrative pri-
vate practice to assume the bench—that the movement is always 
along a one-way street—is contrary to present-day experience. Judges 
can return to private practice if they wish—many do—and their post-
judicial earning power is almost certainly enhanced by the judicial 
experience.186 
Movement from the bench to private practice raises ethical ques-
tions, to be sure; maybe the street should be one way, in the other 
direction. Chief Justice Rehnquist worried that some might be using 
the judiciary as “a stepping stone to a lucrative private practice.”187 
Professor Van Tassel raised “the specter of judges giving preferential 
treatment to litigants who may be future employers and the perception 
of impropriety that such resignations raise.”188 President John F. Ken-
nedy expressed a similar concern: “I don’t think that anyone should 
accept a Federal judgeship unless prepared to fill it for life because I 
think the maintenance of the integrity of the Judiciary is so impor-
tant.”189 Those are valid ethical concerns, but the point nevertheless 
                                                                                                                  
182 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 
49 (1910). 
183 Id. at 50. 
184 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 221 (1980). 
185 As we discuss below, see infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text, Professor 
Vermeule has persuasively argued that the Compensation Clause may actually have lessened 
judicial compensation over time. 
186 For example, fourteen judges retired between 1990 and 1992. Professor Van Tassel de-
termined that “[s]even judges have returned to private practice, three have taken full-time teach-
ing positions, one retired completely, and two have engaged in business activities.” Van Tassel, 
supra note 5, at 399. 
187 Bill McAllister, The Judiciary’s ‘Quiet Crisis’: Prestige Doesn’t Pay the Tuition, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1987, at A19. 
188 Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 363; see also McAllister, supra note 187 (“This is sup-
posed to be the last stop on the road. A judge shouldn’t be thinking about going back to work 
for a law firm that’s coming before him. That’s unhealthy.”) (quoting Judge Abner Mikva). 
189 DAVID STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES 8-9 (1974). 
Fo
r a
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
co
py
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
pe
r, 
pl
ea
se
 v
isi
t: 
ht
tp
://
ss
rn
.c
om
/a
bs
tra
ct
=9
41
15
8
  
1008 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
 
remains: in the world we inhabit, federal judges are not locked in to a 
life of squalor. 
Professor Vermeule has provided another reason why the recruit-
ing-tool rationale should be viewed with skepticism: the Clause may 
actually have contributed to salaries’ being lower than would other-
wise have been the case. If that is so—if the “selection effects” of the 
Clause actually operate to keep judicial salaries down rather than 
up—that is a pretty obvious reason for jettisoning the rationale.190 
The theory that the Clause provides an economic enticement to po-
tential judges, argues Vermeule, “fails to take into account that Con-
gress, like prospective judges, can anticipate the effects of the 
Clause’s structure.”191 The key part of that structure is the Clause’s 
ratchet effect: salaries may go up but cannot come down.192 Faced 
with such a restriction on compensation, a reasonable employer—and 
Congress is occasionally reasonable—may be leery of supporting 
raises that could turn out to be difficult to sustain: 
[L]egislators understand the structure of the Compensation 
Clause as well as anyone else, and anticipate that any salary 
increase for the judges will be frozen into place by force of 
constitutional law. The predictable equilibrium reaction, one 
the Framers ought themselves to have anticipated but failed 
to, is that Congress is more reluctant to raise judicial salaries 
in the first instance.193 
Members of Congress operating under a “when in doubt, do not in-
crease compensation” standard are, over time, almost certainly going 
to err on the side of under- rather than over-compensating judges. At 
the margin, therefore, “[l]egislators who anticipate the ratchet effect 
of any future increase will award fewer increases.”194 
                                                                                                                  
190 Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REV. 953 (2005); 
see Vermeule, supra note 6, at 535-37 (juxtaposing the “currency effects” view of the Compen-
sation Clause with a “selection effects” analysis). 
191 Vermeule, supra note 190, at 985. 
192 One happy result of the ratchet effect, according to Vermeule, is that it provides a check 
on the judicial self-dealing that can otherwise occur in Compensation Clause cases. Vermeule, 
supra note 6, at 522 (“The judges have no power to initiate increases; they can only block legis-
lative actions that are claimed to effect unconstitutional decreases in judicial compensation.”). 
193 Vermeule, supra note 190, at 985. 
194 Id. With the “selection effects” of the Compensation Clause trading off against “cur-
rency effects,” the results are not at all straightforward: 
[E]xcessively low compensation might produce a cadre of insufficiently talented 
amateur enthusiasts, but excessively high compensation might produce a cadre of 
talented but venal opportunists. So the argument from selection effects is always in-
complete if it fails to specify why the salary level claimed to be inadequate is on the 
low side of the optimum point. 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 536-37. 
Fo
r a
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
co
py
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
pe
r, 
pl
ea
se
 v
isi
t: 
ht
tp
://
ss
rn
.c
om
/a
bs
tra
ct
=9
41
15
8
  
2006]   TAXATION, COMPENSATION, AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 1009 
 
We disagree with Professor Vermeule on some particulars,195 but 
we agree on a fundamental point: a broad interpretation of the Com-
pensation Clause, particularly as the Clause might apply to taxation, 
is unnecessary to recruit the sort of people we should want to serve on 
the federal bench.196 
The recruitment rationale is thus a shaky underpinning for the 
Compensation Clause, but the Supreme Court has endorsed it. The 
Court has unthinkingly accepted the propositions that the Clause 
serves to keep salaries up, and that higher after-tax compensation may 
be constitutionally favored. As a result, one can imagine a future 
judge—one with skin thick enough to handle public ridicule—
challenging a tax of general application on the ground that the tax has 
the effect of making judicial take-home pay unattractive to potential 
judges. And if the Court takes seriously an open-ended justification 
for preserving the economic positions of federal judges, it is possible 
that a tax not affecting judicial independence might be treated as vio-
lating the Compensation Clause. That would be a bizarre result as a 
matter of constitutional law, but it would not be an impossible one 
under existing doctrine. 
Of course, reducing taxes on federal judges could be a backdoor 
way of increasing their real compensation, and, as salaries for new 
law firm associates increase—and occasionally skyrocket—one might 
applaud that goal.197 But, as is always the case, we should not conflate 
policy arguments and the requirements of constitutional law. 
VI. A FEW FINAL THOUGHTS ON TAXATION AND 
JUDICIAL TURNOVER 
Professor Vermeule turned the recruitment rationale on its head: 
the Compensation Clause may actually have worked over the years to 
limit, rather than enhance, judicial compensation. Another practical 
consideration should be taken into account in evaluating the Clause’s 
effects on taxation. If the recruitment rationale has any substantive 
force—and we are skeptical about that—it should not be applied in a 
way that might actually reduce judicial quality. Exempting federal 
                                                                                                                  
195 For example, we think that the Compensation Clause has been properly interpreted to 
forbid a tax that discriminates against the judiciary. Vermeule does not. Vermeule, supra note 6, 
at 504. 
196 Vermeule’s analysis leads him to doubt “that an interpretation of the Clause prohibiting 
only a reduction in statutory salaries will not attract a sufficiently talented pool of judges.” Id. at 
537. 
197 We applaud similar sentiments directed at the compensation of another grossly under-
paid segment of society, the law professoriate. 
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judges from a tax of general application would do just that: it would 
create an incentive for judges to stay on the bench too long. 
History is replete with examples of judges who remained on the 
bench after physical and mental infirmity had set in, and judicial 
compensation policies sometimes contributed to that problem. In the 
early years of the republic, the lack of pensions for retired judges 
made leaving the bench financially disastrous for some. That problem 
was later addressed, but, in the early twentieth century, with a na-
tional income tax in place, a new concern arose: the income tax sud-
denly applied in full force to a retired judge whose judicial income, 
with Evans and Miles on the books, had been exempt from taxation.198 
Even if retirement pay equaled judicial pay, after-tax income dropped 
with retirement, a clear disincentive to leave the bench. If quality is a 
concern—and of course it is—the compensation of federal judges, 
and the taxation of that compensation, should be structured in such a 
way that those no longer able to meet the demands of judging can go 
quietly, in a financially secure way.199 
Although the founders realized that life tenure could lead to very 
long terms—and, for that reason, some Anti-Federalists were worried 
about excessive judicial independence200—long terms were unlikely to 
be the norm in the late eighteenth century. Life expectancy was so 
much lower then than today that worrying about a superannuated ju-
diciary may have seemed like a waste of time. 
The founders’ blissful ignorance on this point did not last long, 
however. Life expectancy may have been short, but judicial infirmity 
                                                                                                                  
198 Or so it was assumed. In fact, it was assumed that Congress could reduce retirement pay 
directly, and during the Great Depression it did so. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying 
text. We are not convinced that the governing assumption was correct. The danger of congres-
sional retaliation in response to an unpopular judicial opinion is as real here as it is in the situa-
tions to which the Compensation Clause was clearly intended to apply. (It might not seem like a 
real concern in any circumstance, but the founders thought there was something to worry about.) 
Retirement income is not a gratuity, after all; it is deferred compensation attributable to a 
judge’s time on the bench. 
In any event, a direct reduction in retirement income is exceedingly unlikely ever to hap-
pen again. A decline in the value of retirement compensation is quite another thing, of course. 
However, because such a decline for sitting judges has been held not to violate the Clause, see 
supra note 108, it is inconceivable that such a decline in value would be seen to have constitu-
tional problems. 
199 See Rosenn, supra note 24, at 328 (“To induce infirm and/or superannuated judges to 
retire, Congress has been forced to eliminate virtually all of the economic incentives for remain-
ing on active status.”); Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 395-99. 
200 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 42 (noting possibility of terms of thirty or forty 
years). As far as we can tell, however, no one in the founding debates argued that a cap on 
salary increases, a possibility that was taken seriously, might encourage judicial turnover in a 
desirable way. Even the Anti-Federalists, who were concerned that the Constitution provided 
too much independence to the judiciary, did not make that argument. See supra Part I. Maybe 
they should have. 
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soon became a serious problem. And retiring was often not an eco-
nomically feasible option for the disabled judges. As Professor Van 
Tassel explains, “For the first eight decades of the federal judici-
ary, . . . [a]ged judges were forced to choose between resigning from 
the bench and losing their salary, or continuing in office (often de-
spite incapacity) in order to retain financial support.”201 
In 1869, Congress, for the first time, passed legislation providing 
for retirement pay for judges. The legislation allowed a judge who 
had reached the age of seventy with at least ten years in service to 
retire with an annual pension equal to his salary at the time of 
retirement.202 The primary motivation was apparently to push some 
Supreme Court justices, particularly Robert C. Grier and Samuel 
Nelson, in the direction of the sunset, and it worked.203 Congress 
finally recognized, according to Van Tassel, “that there were good 
reasons to allow elderly judges to retire without consigning them to 
destitution.”204 
Retirement compensation for federal judges has been modified in 
fits and starts since that time, but Congress has always tried to facili-
tate a desirable level of judicial turnover. Perhaps the most important 
change with constitutional overtones was the creation, in 1919, of 
what would later be called “senior” status, making it possible for 
judges to leave active duty without totally resigning from office (and 
thus to continue to be protected by the Compensation Clause), while 
permitting the President to nominate additional judges to fill the “ac-
tive” slots.205 
                                                                                                                  
201 Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 395. 
202 Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45 (“[A]ny judge of any court of the 
United States, who, . . . having attained to the age of seventy years, [shall] resign his office, 
shall thereafter, during the residue of his natural life, receive the same salary which was by law 
payable to him at the time of his resignation.”). 
203 Fairman, supra note 93, at 416-19; John S. Goff, Old Age and the Supreme Court, in 
SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 30, 32-35 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 
1973); Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 396-97. Attorney General Edward Bates noted in his diary in 
1864 that Chief Justice Taney and Justices Wayne, Catron, and Grier “would gladly retire, if 
Congress would pass the proposed bill—to enable the justices to resign, upon an adequate 
pensi[o]n.” THE DIARY OF EDWARD BATES, 1859–1866, at 358 (Howard K. Beale ed., 1933). 
Without the legislation, however, “most of them, if not all, cannot afford to resign, having no 
support but their salaries.” Id. The justices were lobbied as Congress considered the legislation. 
According to Fairman, Philadelphia lawyer George Harding wrote on July 19, 1869, to Joseph 
P. Bradley: “A kind of pledge was made that [Justice Grier] w.d [sic] resign if the bill was 
passed in its present form.” Fairman, supra note 93, at 417 (citation omitted). 
204 Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 397. 
205 See Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, § 6, 40 Stat. 1156, 1157. Section 6 states, in relevant 
part: 
But, instead of resigning, any judge other than a justice of the Supreme Court, who is 
qualified to resign under the foregoing provisions, may retire, upon the salary of 
which he is then in receipt, from regular active service on the bench, and the Presi-
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Under the law today—as has been generally true for decades—the 
retirement pay for a judge who altogether leaves the bench is that 
which he was receiving at the time of retirement (“retirement on 
salary”). For a judge who assumes senior status, the compensation 
continues to be that for the office (“retirement on senior status”)—
thus including increases provided by Congress (such as cost of living 
adjustments).206 
Direct diminution in compensation is not possible—on that point, 
all commentators agree—and Congress cannot tax judges in a dis-
criminatory way. Congress thus cannot impose a tax intended to drive 
judges off the bench. And judges should be subject to taxes of general 
application, as they will be unless the recruitment rationale is given 
independent weight.207 As a result, a retired judge will be subject to 
the income tax just as he was on the bench, and taxation should there-
fore create no incentive for a judge to stay on the bench longer than is 
                                                                                                                  
 
dent shall thereupon be authorized to appoint a successor; but a judge so retiring may 
nevertheless be called upon [to fulfill a number of service obligations]. 
Since 1919, Congress has fine-tuned judicial retirement provisions on several occasions. E.g., 
Act of Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24 (giving Supreme Court justices same choice between 
retiring or resigning that other life-term judges had been given earlier); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 371, 62 Stat. 869, 903 (permitting judges resigning at age seventy, after ten years’ ser-
vice, to receive salary they were receiving when they resigned, while permitting judges assum-
ing what was in effect senior status to receive the future salary of the office); Act of Feb. 10, 
1954, ch. 6, § 4, 68 Stat. 8, 12 (extending “senior status” option to judges who had reached age 
sixty-five and served at least fifteen years); Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 5, 72 
Stat. 848, 849 (changing name of judges retiring from regular active service from “retired” 
judges to “senior” judges); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-353, § 204(a), 98 Stat. 333, 350 (adopting modified “rule of 80,” allowing judges to 
take senior status on a sliding scale of age and service totaling at least eighty); Judicial Im-
provements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1005(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4666 
(1988) (dealing with military retirement pay for senior or retired judges); Ethics Reform Act of 
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 705(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1770 (dealing with requirements senior 
judges must satisfy to receive salary of office); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-317, § 301, 110 Stat. 3847, 3851 (providing for possibility of retroactive credit for 
senior judge’s resuming significant court workload); National Defense Authorization Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 654(a), 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-165 (2000) (providing same treat-
ment for federal judges as for other federal officials regarding military retirement pay); Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 303, 114 Stat. 2410, 2417 (making 
technical change regarding payments to military survivors benefits plan). See generally Van 
Tassel, supra note 5, at 397-98. 
206 28 U.S.C. § 371(a), (b) (2000). Cost-of-living adjustments, where applicable, “shall not 
apply to the extent it would reduce the salary of any individual whose compensation may not, 
under section 1 of article III of the Constitution of the United States, be diminished during such 
individual’s continuance in office.” Id. § 461(b). 
207 See supra Part V. In addition, those judges who benefit from the result in Hatter (those 
sitting in 1983 when the OASDI tax was extended to the federal judiciary) will be preferentially 
treated until they completely leave the bench. 
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appropriate. That result is consistent with the Compensation Clause’s 
dictates, and it is the right result as a matter of policy.208 
We are now seeing proposals, from serious scholars, for a limit on 
judicial terms, particularly for Supreme Court justices.209 Some jus-
tices, it is argued, have overstayed their welcome—remaining on the 
bench longer than their physical and mental capacities permit, and 
also losing touch with the real world.210 
We do not mean to endorse those proposals, but our discussion in 
this article is relevant to this question. The understanding of the 
Compensation Clause, and of compensation generally, should operate 
to ensure that judges are not staying on the bench primarily for finan-
cial reasons. The recruitment rationale was not part of original under-
standing, and we think it was never an appropriate justification for the 
Compensation Clause. Making sure that judges are subject to taxes of 
general application, just like other American citizens—one of the 
apparent results of Hatter—is consistent with judicial independence, 
the real goal of the Compensation Clause, and it also ensures that the 
compensation scheme for federal judges does not operate to diminish 
the quality of the federal bench. 
* * * * * 
We have shown, we hope, that the application of the Compensa-
tion Clause to the taxation of federal judges has a long and interesting 
history. With the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in United States v. 
Hatter, however, it is time for that history to come to an end. The 
Hatter decision should preclude future arguments that federal judges 
are automatically exempt from the application of nondiscriminatory 
national taxes; indeed, such an argument should have been regarded 
as preposterous at any time in our history. Judges should have the 
same obligations as other citizens. Furthermore, the idea that exemp-
tion from taxation is necessary to recruit able people to the federal 
bench, an idea that has been hinted at in many cases over the years 
and that was reinforced in Hatter, is just wrong-headed. It is not sup-
                                                                                                                  
208 If the judge is completely retiring, and not merely moving to another line of employ-
ment, he will no longer be subject to Social Security taxes upon leaving the bench. That result is 
not anomalous, however; it is consistent with the way any other retired employee is treated. In 
any event, if an incentive is created by that result, it is to retire rather than to stay too long. 
209 See, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Paul 
D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton eds., 2006). 
210 The concern is not new. Between 1809 and 1869, members of Congress proposed four 
constitutional amendments that would have established mandatory retirement ages for federal 
judges. Van Tassel, supra note 5, at 396; see also Fairman, supra note 93, at 397, 433-35 (not-
ing, at time of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, the “general agreement that it would probably be 
desirable to bring about earlier retirement through a constitutional amendment” and providing 
proposed language for such an amendment). 
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ported by the history or logic of the Compensation Clause, and it 
sends an inappropriate signal about the importance of service on the 
federal bench. 
The Clause does prohibit discriminatory taxation, or so we have 
argued, but that proposition too should be irrelevant to future legal 
analysis. Although the federal judges in Hatter convinced the Su-
preme Court that the extension of a Social Security tax to them was in 
fact discriminatory, and therefore invalid—even though Congress had 
no mean-spirited goal in mind with the extension—the probability of 
a similar set of facts arising again is very small. 
To be sure, mean-spiritedness seems to be on the rise in the politi-
cal arena, and perhaps we cannot rule out Congress’s enacting a tax 
that overtly discriminates against the judiciary. But we still think that 
to be unlikely. Congress has so many weapons in its arsenal, and 
taxation is an inefficient means of conveying congressional disap-
proval of the judiciary. In any event, if Congress were to declare war 
on the judiciary, whether by use of taxation or other means, the tech-
nical dictates of the Compensation Clause would be the least of the 
nation’s worries. 
